


the christian SCHOLAR



Faulkner's Essential Vision / Ralph J. Mills, Jr.
Theology and Prayer / Thomas A. Langford
The Sciences and Responsibility
Joseph D. Havens / O. Hobart Mowrer
David Bakan / James Houston Shrader
other articles and reviews

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The Sciences' Pressure Toward Responsibility

The Editor's Preface

The leavening influence of the sciences, both physical and behavioral, which is felt throughout contemporary society and institutions of higher learning, has still to make its impact apparent for greater realism and a firmer grasp of responsibility among us. It is rather remarkable that despite the many scores of scientists in our colleges and universities so many of the practices in education in these institutions, as in the wider realm of politics, remain largely untouched by the empirical realism and hardheaded encounter with the facts which the principles of science insist upon. What institutions of higher education do tends to be governed by tradition, adjustment to numerous external pressures, or improvised while the search for long-range insight is carried forward. The same is also largely true in the life of the nation. There are, to be sure, many studies — in education, of students and their attitudes and the effects of education upon them, of curricula, administrative processes, and many other details. But so many of these factual studies have been of the *ad hoc* variety, separated from systematic theory and either so specialized or so provincial in orientation that generalization from their conclusions is made impossible.

This is a situation which persists at the very time when psychology, many of

the new social sciences, and some emerging sciences oriented toward human behavior have advanced with great rapidity. They have produced concepts and theories, methods of investigation and increased factual knowledge, and accumulations of analyses and interpretations, many of which are of immediate relevance for many of the problems of higher education. What is missing? We may suggest that education itself must become the object of new thought and research. Fresh perspectives are always needed on old problems and a new impetus for some previously unexplored directions may be called for. Perhaps the need is for a reinterpretation of educational goals viewed in light of reasonable standards of accomplishment. Thus, instead of giving lip service to almost total goals for life itself as the aim of education, even failures might be subjected to dependable appraisal. If this were possible, then the scientists who give attention to education could at the same time contribute to our knowledge about the actual functioning of social institutions and the factual existence of personal life.

It may be, however, that a totally different climate should be prepared for the various behavioral sciences. This, it is proposed, would be an atmosphere in which the systematic conclusions of

the various human sciences would be made not only accessible but also acceptable to the academic community. In addition to some "translation" of the scientists' conclusions this would also require an understanding and appropriation of the advancement of these sciences, however slow and imprecise, in the circles of higher education. Given some preparation the various specialized researchers might then begin to have a perceptible influence upon the processes of higher educational institutions generally and upon concepts and methods in other academic disciplines more particularly.

These various proposals for improving the situation are, nevertheless, somewhat shallow. It is not more studies, or the singling out of educational aims, or a more agreeable atmosphere which can bring about the change, though all of these may be by-products of the change that is needed. This issue of *The Christian Scholar* contains a number of papers which carry the implicit concern for maturity and responsibility. "The science of psychology has reached adolescence," reports Dr. Joseph Havens, and he shows that different streams of thought and work in this discipline have moved it toward a new stage of self-confidence. A "new" and somewhat dubious type of liberty gained from the same discipline is appraised by Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer. The warning he gives us may be a clue to what is needed; he asserts that the freedom which has been granted has not been linked with the recovery of responsibility.

Dr. Mowrer, who after years of identification with psychotherapy broke away from Freudian concepts a decade or more ago, criticizes the tendency in the human sciences to help men escape both freedom and responsibility. Looking back in history he views the Protestant Reformation as leaving us "without clear and effective means of dealing with personal guilt." This, he says, is the inadequacy which spawned Freud who, in his words, "sought to rescue man from the perplexities of the Protestant Ethic and the ravages of unresolved guilt, not by restoring him to full ethical responsibility but by 'relieving' him of all responsibility." The failures of religion and of psychiatry are, therefore, twin failures, and the failures are in the most important human areas of freedom and responsibility. This is the thesis he develops in a recent book, entitled, *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion*.

Dr. David Bakan, also a psychologist, finds that his discipline is a possible means of entrance into two complexes of thought, the scientific and the religious. Fixity, he asserts, in either of these two complexes leads to idolatry and splits them apart; hence there is a priority of search over fulfillment and an appreciation of the unmanifest over the certainty of answers. Dr. James Houston Shrader, a physical scientist, is concerned in another essay to root both science and religion in human need and to show how, in this context, they may serve one another as well. Thus the scientist sees the human significance of his work, and, emphasizing the anthro-

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pological framework for the dialogue and the search for insight, he sees the need for that quality of humility in mind and spirit which can advance a responsible intellectual enterprise. Still other essays suggest a number of the ways in which this dialogue and search may be addressed.

Within the various sciences there is a new discernible pressure toward responsibility. Such a new emphasis is not, however, something added on; it is not an extra, a plus, beyond the skilled practice of the scientific endeavor. It is, rather, something wholly native to the sciences when they achieve maturity. When they move from an uneasy self-consciousness toward a resolute self-confidence the sciences can carry on their proper work. Instead of being preoccupied with the spectacular they can provide access to reality as it confronts the serious inquirer, especially the inquirer who is prepared to give it systematic interpretation within a human and ethical context. This, therefore, is what the scientists have been waiting to do: to give access to what is, in fact, there and to understand it within the framework of what human beings are to do about it. Such appraisal is, moreover, a dimension of what is real.

Someone recently said that to understand the term, "true," one should have in his mind not only some abstract ideal or merely a piece of language, but rather the image of a carpenter cutting and fitting the wood for a joint. The term should in this manner employ all the normal logical tests — correspondence, coherence, and the rest. But,

beyond these, the total meaning of the term can be had only when we realize that what is asserted or believed must square with all the facts, it must fit from every angle and perspective. It is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to assert anything which cannot from other perspectives be turned into an absurdity. But trustworthy reality must be encountered in a way which can make its communication convincing. When we first learn to read or begin reading in a new field we can only receive what we are learning with complete credulousness. But even the naive reader will, in time, discover a liar, because of the peculiar nature of truth. Truth, whether it is solid orthodoxy or the most radical thought, is eventually obvious; one does not need to read backwards, take an author unawares by climbing up his back, as it were, and frustrate his ingenious arrangement of the material, to have the truth or falsity of what he is saying become clear. Truth makes its own claim; it is the way reality is; it squares with the facts, all of the facts, set within a human context.

The scientist today is achieving the maturity, even in his studies of human behavior, which was attributed to the wisdom writers of the Old Testament. Insofar as the pressure upon him is towards responsibility he may find his parallel with the very modern, yet ancient, wisdom literature. Striking as the differences are, the opportunity lies before the sciences to serve this generation along lines similar to those followed by the writers whose art was that

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of piloting the way through life. Rational clarification of the world, differentiating the orders and planes on which experience takes place, and trying to disclose the order that is at work at the bottom of things are needed today as they were in the world of antiquity. Working with reason on the basis of serious common sense toward the end of rational comprehension is needed wherever confusion exists and chaos threatens our understanding of experience.

For the men of wisdom the facts of human experience seemed so often to be paradoxical. To avoid the chaos of anarchy, they frequently formulated the paradoxes in ways which suggested that a righteous and merciful order lay behind human life, even though this assurance had to be patiently awaited and would be available only by going through experience to order. Wisdom, thus, consisted in having the comprehension of order (the theories) which would give room to the facts. Folly is the disorder at the center of man's being, the absence of wisdom.

The striking difference between today's behavioral scientist and the ancient man of wisdom lies at the point of the apprehension of the fundamental orders of the world. For ancient writers this was an apprehension implicit in the

Divine providence and his wisdom found its culmination in the realization that since God had his own ways of governing the world, therefore men could live in confidence and responsibility. True, human insight is to step down from God's incomprehensible ways; yet human life, and the natural order with it, are set incomprehensibly within the framework of a divine order. Life is set behind and before by God. Wisdom literature could, therefore, pre-occupy itself with the most detailed affairs or with the majestic greatness of the righteous and merciful order of God. It began with table manners; it ended with the recognition that when we come to the limits of mystery, there must be a coolness, a slowness to anger, an unlimited sense of trustworthiness. However important wisdom is, it is not, in itself, man's salvation. This begins for the man of wisdom and the contemporary scientist in the knowledge of God. Such knowledge is not the end of wisdom; it is, instead, the starting point of education in truth, in terms of which all things work for balance and confidence. To begin at this starting point is to find that encounter with reality, however confusing and paradoxical, is a steady pressure toward responsibility.

The cover artist for this issue is Robert Charles Brown of Design Associates, Uncasville, Connecticut. The type-face for the cover is Hammer Unziale designed by Victor Hammer of Lexington, Kentucky.

Faulkner's Essential Vision : Notes on *A Fable*

RALPH J. MILLS, JR.

Soon painters would forget at the cost of what anguish this man had ranged his solitary and hopeless art against the entire civilization into which he had been born. From those still dazzling embers they would retain only the advent of the individual, the metamorphosis of the world in pictures. And yet. . . .

André Malraux, *Saturn: An Essay on Goya*

I

Readers and critics have long been aware of the mythical and legendary propensities of William Faulkner's writing and lengthy discussions of his use of the South have ensued. Like all creators of his stature he makes his own universe. Yoknapatawpha county, a fictional region based upon that area of Mississippi where Faulkner has spent most of his life, is, surely enough, an analogue for the world; what occurs there in miniature mirrors the life of the American continent, which in turn manages to reflect the Western hemisphere, all the while retaining a peculiarly local flavor. Within this cosmos the writer is able to achieve that stylized sense of life that develops character through action and event, through the effects of violence and change in the social structure, rather than through a careful documentation of personality. Such treatment is inevitable if we see that for Faulkner the human condition lies between two states, one from which it has fallen and one which it strives to attain. The novelist's moral imagination envisages his characters as involved in an underlying guilt, though they are free — by an effort of the will — to extricate and redeem themselves and, in a way, all of humanity with them. In accomplishing this they become mythologized and act as symbolic projects for man, stars by which he can steer a course. All of this varies in degree and motive in the novels. The Reverend Hightower of *Light in August*, for example, brings himself to ruin and his wife to vice and suicide by immersing his own life in the wild deeds of a Civil War predecessor to the exclusion of reality. It is the appearance of Joe Christmas that moves him from physical and moral torpor to the immediacy of his situation. Thus Faulkner is concerned with man *in time*, but Jean-Paul Sartre in his essay on *The Sound and the Fury* confuses the characters' view with that of the

Mr. Ralph J. Mills, Jr. is the Executive Secretary of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Illinois. This article is a somewhat revised version of an essay that appeared in *Gemini*, in England, in the Autumn 1957 issue, Volume I, number 3.

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author. The individual, in this and other books, discovers himself trapped in the present, caught at a point where numerous forces and actions converge. His choice allows him to escape into the past, as Quentin does, but this fails to resolve the difficulties, it only deepens them. In Faulkner's opinion man must stand over against the simultaneous rush of elements that sweep over him and threaten to drown all moral decision or annihilate him. In a universe which appears largely deterministic the human choice takes on added importance. When he chooses, man begins to show his worth. Sartre, in identifying Quentin with Faulkner, misses the novel's intent and the novelist's scheme of values.

If consciousness of his situation will frequently bring reaction, there must be an agent of awareness either to impress man with the necessity of choice or to outline a state of affairs, even if no resolution to a dilemma is forthcoming. Therefore, Faulkner has several times used certain analogies to the figure of Christ in his characters to develop consciousness, and to contrast pointedly different scales of valuation. In *The Sound and the Fury*, Benjy's innocence and isolation, thwarted love for Caddy, and his castration serve not merely to display him as the final product of a degenerated family line but also as the object of the remaining members' scorn. Love and innocence are inchoate amongst them. Jason continues the corrupt maternal side, freed, Faulkner suggests, of all Compson blood; Quentin, Jr., brings the paternal heritage to a conclusion when she elopes with a circus man. Benjy remains a mute conscience, surveying through the endless movements and associations of his mind the disastrous family history. Like Christ, he cannot make his love generally felt or accepted; and the castration is a last dishonor insuring his complete impotence. Similarly, Joe Christmas, who possesses few Christian virtues himself, is, because of his blood mixture, made an outcast. However, the destiny he pursues unwittingly places him in the role of a sacrificial victim who transforms like some catalytic body the lives of those directly or indirectly in contact with him. His death, a modern crucifixion, raises him to the level of a mythic figure and this image is engraved on the minds of the townspeople who could not accept him and hunted him down.

These themes are brought to focus in *A Fable*. While adhering to the shifting structural qualities and points of view that are among the distinguishing marks of his art Faulkner has heightened somewhat his elaborate techniques of stylization. The tone of the book is furiously digressive and philosophic. As a method of composition, this helps to achieve the impression of a rapid and terrible pace of events, and the sudden inevitability with which characters must face them. In an apparently random and merciless framework, the chaos of war, the individual has to master his situation or be mastered by it.

The novel, as the title indicates, is a fable. In this allegorical respect, it bears certain kinship to the moral tales of D. H. Lawrence, though its interests

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are wider and perhaps deeper. On the other hand it contains the ingredients of character, realism of detail, dramatic tension of interests and occurrences, and inclusiveness we associate with novelistic fiction. These two aspects, fabulistic and novelistic, contribute to the realization of Faulkner's idea, which is to present the trial of man in extreme terms and on a grand scale. And the intensity of the art involved precludes any overinflation or pomposity. Instead there is a basic simplicity underlying the seeming complexities of the book. It is the Christian story that furnishes the author with the principles of construction he needs.

For Faulkner the values represented by the events of the Passion Week are permanent features of man's ethical equipment. This should keep us at the outset from mistaking the Corporal for Christ. He is rather the imitation of Christ and is given the modest and compelling portrait necessary to maintain a fairly close parallel with the Gospels, while the author, by references to the *original sacrifice*, prevents confusion and ambiguity. If this is the novel's controlling myth (I do not use the word in any reductive sense) and the means of organizing the action, then our concentration is centered not on matters of theology but on the behavior of men. The emphasis is revealed in an old Negro preacher's reply to the Runner's query if he is an ordained minister:

"I don't know. I bears witness."

"To what? God?"

"To man. God don't need me. I bears witness to him of course, but my main witness is to man."

The peace that the Corporal and his disciples bring about creates a crisis in the affairs of the world. Because of this the characters are forced to countenance the fundamental questions of their humanity. Out of such experience they must either take on life in a new way and increase, or decline. This is the most deeply religious level of *A Fable*, a concern with the ethics of human choice.

II

The tensions current throughout the novel arise from the "two articulations" of the Corporal and the Generalissimo, who, in the climactic temptation scene of Thursday night, engage in a naked dialectic fully revealing their separate and irreconcilable positions. But previous to this we recognize that the roots of Faulkner's conception are formed of the opposition between skepticism and trust, between powerful abstract control and personal freedom, between "man's deathless folly" and "man's baseless hopes." Furthermore, it appears that the Generalissimo is in charge of events, that he is capable of their manipulation for his own ends and can guarantee the interpretation put upon them. He has

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begotten his antithesis, the Corporal, whose gesture of piety and heroism he plans to use to administer human weakness. However, in order to see the Generalissimo's attempt — and its failure — in the proper perspective we should look briefly at the narrative.

During the spring of 1918 the French high command decides to launch a divisional attack against the Germans at a particular point. This offensive will purposely fail so that the Group Commander, Bidet [!], can gain promotion, for the action has its place in a larger military scheme. It is this plan that first suggests to the reader the conspiratorial nature of war. The conspiracy extends throughout the ranks of officers, from the Generalissimo to the platoon sergeants. However, Gragnon, the commander of the ill-fated division, is isolated from the other military men of officer's rank by his complete and honest dedication to his career as a soldier. But his faith is shattered when at the moment of attack his troops refuse to leave the trenches. Soon there is a cessation of firing along the entire Allied line; and the Germans, who are undergoing a similar revolution, fail to take advantage of the French confusion. A mutiny for peace, we learn, has been led by a French Corporal and twelve followers. They have since the start of the conflict circulated among the Allied and German troops, pleading for a unified rebellion against the degradation and injustice of war as well as those directing it and profiting by it. When it disobeys the order to attack the division, including the thirteen men who are members of it, is placed under arrest and quickly pulled from the line. Gragnon asks for the execution of the whole division. Ironically enough he is himself arrested and later executed by three American soldiers in a scene of brutal horror. In his stoicism, integrity and true belief in the army, Gragnon achieves a measure of greatness, though he falls far short of the dream of the Corporal and those inspired by him, especially the Runner and the old Negro preacher. He has in good faith given his life to a false ideal and it destroys him.

At the same time that we discover the contrived and cooperative aspects of war and the reaction against them made by the Corporal, Faulkner directs our attention to various other characters who come to assume increasing importance. The most notable of these is the Runner. The British soldier was originally an officer, we are told in flashbacks, but sought to give up his commission and return to the ranks as a private. He despises any position of command and desires the community and relative freedom of the ordinary troops. Denied his request, he devises an amazing and desperate plan of release. He utilizes the services of a prostitute in a public place thus forcing the army to relieve him of officership. The sensational quality of the episode reminds us that his motives are fundamentally pure and that he acts under sheer pressure. Almost immediately upon his arrival in the trenches he learns of the thirteen soldiers "who had been known for a year now among all combat troops below the grade of sergeant

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in the British forces and obviously in the French too," and meets for the first time the old Negro preacher. The latter urges him to seek out the Corporal and "just go look at him," but the Runner, having witnessed the savagery of war, despairs of a humanity unable "to stand erect." He thinks: "*It's not that we didn't believe: it's that we couldn't, didn't know how any more. That's the most terrible thing they have done to us.*" The restoration of belief to the Runner, who becomes, at last, its representative is a major theme of *A Fable*. Renewal begins for him when in Paris he accidentally discovers that organization over which the old Negro preacher presides, *Les Amis Myriades et Anonymes à la France de Tout le Monde*, and is told the story of the miraculous race horse.

If the parallel with Christ's Passion is the basic structural myth in the novel, the account of the Groom, the preacher, his son, and the horse forms a secondary one. It is a fable within a fable and serves both as a means of restoring hope to the Runner and as a parable of belief reflecting the same virtues of perseverance and nobility the Corporal's actions symbolize. The old Negro preacher tells of his connection with the newly purchased (all of this takes place before the war began) horse and the foul-mouthed Cockney groom, the only person the animal will obey. Crossing the country with the horse on the way to the owner's Kentucky stables the train on which they are travelling crashes through a trestle in the midst of the Louisiana bayou country. The horse suffers a broken hip and the three men steal it from the wreckage rather than see it used for breeding purposes. Thus they begin a series of fabulous adventures, dodging police and searchers, racing the three-legged horse "up and down and back and forth through the section of the Mississippi watershed between Illinois and the Gulf of Mexico." In spite of his crippled leg the horse continually, almost magically, wins.

Like D. H. Lawrence's symbolic animal, St. Mawr, this race horse is compelling in the uniqueness and transcendence of its promise. Further, a belief and passion, beyond the realm of probability or fact, transforms the trio of "horse thieves":

no gang of opportunists fleeing with a crippled horse . . . but the immortal pageant-piece of the tender legend which was the crowning glory of man's own legend beginning when his first paired children lost well the world and from which paired prototypes they still challenged paradise.

Through their complete trust in the value of the horse, the Groom, the preacher, and the boy are able to outrun the world and assume an identity comparable to all miraculous archetypal heroes who aspired above their condition in order to realize it more fully. So they are finally brought into community with mankind through their isolation from society. The Groom becomes both a Mason and a Christian while the old preacher joins the Masonic fellowship with his companion. Even the pursuers are incapable of imprisoning these fugitives and the young

deputy, whose actions foreshadow those of the Runner, finds himself committed to the liberty of the three men and their horse.

As Delmore Schwartz points out in his excellent essay on the book the horse draws people into its orbit because of the unequivocal quality it displays — running for the sake of running. In addition the ability to race on three legs and win is the accomplishment of the impossible, and this proves analogous to the Corporal's attainment of the seemingly futile desire for peace. Just as the horse really isn't owned by any man but is "the world's horse," and "things belonged to it, not it to things," the Corporal, in his retracing of Christ's sacrifice, belongs to man as a symbol, an index to action rather than contemplation. The preacher's tale of the race horse revives the Runner's hope and confidence and sets him on the path he will follow with unwavering conviction.

Though we witness the birth of the Runner's determination we soon learn of the Groom's defection. Belief, as the novel bears out, is disinterested, does not seek private gain, but disbelief thrives on acquisition and manipulation. The Groom, having finally shot the horse rather than allow it to be taken back by the owner, falls into skepticism and then animal greed. He loses his faith in everything when deprived of the horse that has sustained him; he becomes a sentry in the British army and utilizes his membership in the Masons, at one time the tacit acceptance of humanity, to establish a gambling game among the troops on the length of their lives. This he finds a profitable venture and repudiates both his past and his attachment to the old preacher. It is only later, led by the Runner to an unexpected martyrdom, that he is struck once more with the realization of brotherhood, the communion of man and man. Caught in no man's land half way between the German and Allied trenches he watches the guns of both armies open fire upon him and the other soldiers from either side who, unarmed, are trying to meet one another in mutual comradeship:

"No!" he cried, "no! Not to us!" not even realizing that he had said "we" and not "I" for the first time in his life probably, certainly for the first time in four years, not even realizing that in the next moment he had said "I" again, shouting to the old Negro as he whirled about: "What did I tell you? Didn't I tell you to let me alone?" Only it was not the old Negro, it was the Runner standing facing him as the first ranging burst of shells bracketed in. He never heard them, nor the wailing rumble of the two barrages either, nor saw nor heard little more of anything in that last second except the Runner's voice crying out of the soundless rush of flame which enveloped half his body neatly from heel through navel through chin:

"They can't kill us! They can't! Not dare not: they can't!"

Along with the Corporal's temptation and execution, this is a crucial point in

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the book, for it marks a death which is at once redemption and spiritual identification. Driven by the tremendous faith and urgency of the Runner the old Negro preacher is given the courage he needed to take action and the Groom is again, at the instant of his death, accepted into the company of men. The Runner, to whom we shall return, will alone be salvaged from the wreckage of this bombardment to persevere. Above all lies the simple haunting image of the Corporal, the source of these developments.

III

The background against which all the characters play their roles is the debate of the two symbolic figures of the Corporal and the Generalissimo, and the attitudes toward man's nature they represent. The principles upon which the Generalissimo bases his leadership are those of power and skepticism. Though he often appears both wise and gentle, his wisdom is one of human defeat and his gentleness is a repression of human possibility. His career from the outset has been an exercise in deception and fabrication. On the surface he seems to have run counter to the mysterious and fabulous origins from which he sprang. Instead of preparing for politics he joined a military academy; he was self-disciplined rather than dissolute; industrious, he graduated at the head of his class; he refused all privileges his family prestige might have obtained him. Upon graduation he went directly to a desolate African outpost. This experience with its overtones of a descent into hell educated him in the extremities of behavior, besides initiating him to that life for which he was preparing. This was the setting:

a well, a flagstaff, a single building of loopholed clay set in a seared irreconcilable waste of sun and sand which few living men have ever seen, to which troops were sent as punishment, or incorrigibles, for segregation until heat and monotony on top of their natural and acquired vices divorced them permanently from mankind.

Here the Generalissimo-to-be developed his low opinion of man, fit merely to be treated as a beast, an object to be manipulated for desired goals if one were shrewd enough to do so. He ran the camp for more than his allotted time and saw, through his cruel sacrifice of an outcast soldier, how a man's death could be put to use. He left this command to go to some remote Tibetan monastery and continue his rigorous training. During this period, he also begot, by adultery, the son who will oppose him, the Corporal. However, before his departure from the desert outpost, his old friend, who is to become the Quartermaster General, visited him and accidentally stumbled across the Generalissimo's true nature when he remarked,

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Because you will not need anybody wherever it is you are going now in order to return from it. Mind you, I don't ask where. I was about to say "to find whom or what you will need to be your instrument" but I refrained from that in time too . . . I know that you are going wherever it is that you are going, in order to return from it when the time, the moment comes, in the shape of man's living hope.

Indeed, the Generalissimo is the world's hope, but only in an ironic sense. For he is the champion of the vast amorphous mob that moves between the Place de Ville and the prison camp before the Corporal's execution — a swarming mass of people devoid of all but brute emotions. The Corporal is intended as an instrument by which to control this mass humanity; his death will be another illusory trick to satisfy their emotional cravings, their demands for revenge. At the same time he will become an heroic image for those few who believe in man.

The Generalissimo can, by such careful exploitation, maintain his power over the crowd and the faithful individuals, too. In all this he is supported by endless ranks of politicians and profiteers and "all the other accredited traveling representatives of the vast solvent organizations and fraternities and movements which control by coercion or cajolery man's morals and actions and all mass values for affirmation or negation. . . ." The whole scheme of war and its subsidiary events recounted in *A Fable* arises from the domination of man by vested interests and institutions that deny his freedom and his resources. The depths of this corruption are exhibited in the episode of the chaplain's suicide. He comes to the Corporal as the final form of temptation, and perhaps the most insidious, for his appearance of authenticity as a priest really covers an inner disillusion, a faith that has succumbed to the promises of civilization. Thus the chaplain's very act of self-destruction after failing to dissuade the Corporal from his intentions is a denial of human dignity, a betrayal in the manner of Judas, and an obscene parody of Christ's own death. While Christ (and the Corporal after Him) died for others, this clergyman dies for himself; he cannot face the defeat and humiliation to which he has so abruptly been brought. His behavior discloses the mortal disease clinging to the heart of the systems of control.

Critics who have called this novel Manichean have mistaken the Generalissimo for a heretical image of God the Father, as well as the Corporal for Christ. None of this is correct. It would be better to say that the Generalissimo is the Antichrist, the prince of this world, because he is able to recognize the full assertion of belief and turn it to his own account. A full revelation of this diabolism occurs in the temptation scene where he displays his personal code in trying to beguile the Corporal, a conviction that, as Delmore Schwartz remarks, "human beings are worthless." All his protestations to the contrary are specious and windy arguments drawing him more directly into the open. The attitude he adopts towards the Corporal, though superficially mild and charitable, is con-

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temptuous. He has begotten this son, as the Quartermaster General predicted, to employ as his "instrument." The Generalissimo knows in advance that the temptations he offers — the riches and kingdoms of the earth, freedom, life itself — will be spurned. He can utter such promises in a spirit of confidence, for he knows the Corporal is incorruptible. Furthermore, his insistence on the rightness of his trust in man is founded on guile, ignorance and the valuation of iniquity. His lengthy statement is a parody of portions of Faulkner's famous Nobel Prize speech on dignity, including them as part of the rhetoric in favor of his debased view. After praising man for his vices the Generalissimo concludes:

"... I don't fear man, I do better: I respect and admire him. And pride: I am ten times prouder of that immortality which he does possess than ever that heavenly one of his delusion. Because man and his folly —"

"Will endure," the Corporal said.

"They will do more," the old general said proudly.

"They will prevail."

The "immortality" that wins the Generalissimo's approval is, however, the *real* delusion; it is embodied in the successive manifestations of Western society, the products of "rapacity," all the means by which man is kept short of his humanity. The old leader's estimate derives from the basest measure.

Yet it must seem, in spite of the beautiful simplicity of his replies to the temptations, with the Corporal's execution and burial that his cause is a lost one. Though he is at no time a puppet in the Generalissimo's hands and acts out of a freedom that is his alone, the turmoil aroused by the mutiny seems finally settled into the dusty, scarred landscape of battle. The crowd's lust is satiated; the war can resume and be drawn soon to a convenient close; there is no apparent loss of strength on the part of the ruling groups. The events of the week end when the Corporal's body disappears from its resting place in a field near his family's farm, dislodged during an artillery barrage. This surprising 'resurrection' makes way for the concluding ironies and triumph of the last chapter, entitled "Tomorrow." We might also call it, borrowing from Charles Williams, the descent of the dove.

IV

In the opening part of the final section we are told the story of twelve soldiers led by an officious and humorless sergeant. The war has ended and this group has been chosen to go to Verdun and there collect a body destined for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Paris. The soldiers are to accompany the body to its destination in a flag-bedecked train. The presentation of their experience by

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Faulkner is grisly, pathetic, and outrageously comical, but the culmination is sharp and ironic and further develops the range of the entire novel. Because they want liquor the soldiers sell the original corpse they have claimed to an old peasant woman who believes it is the son she lost in battle. Then, fearful of the dilemma in which they have put themselves, the men obtain another body from a farmer they meet while drinking. This time they receive the Corporal himself whose corpse has turned up in the farmer's field, obviously blown there by the shelling. He now becomes a substitute for the unidentified Verdun soldier and will be enshrined in the nation's monument to its war dead. In their picaresque adventure the twelve men act without knowing it as disciples to the "defeated" Corporal. His placement in a memorial to the victims of civilization's folly and the greed of states is a poetic irony appropriate to Faulkner's deepest intentions.

But as if this were not justice enough the Runner reappears with another survivor of the war. The two men visit the Corporal's family and are given his medal by the sister, a token of their inheritance. The Runner, horribly mutilated and disfigured by the massacre from which he alone has recovered, has assumed the role of clown or divine simpleton — a version of the traditional 'fool for Christ's sake' of legend and tale. The last scene of the book merges in two-fold irony the Corporal's exalted tomb and the Runner's invulnerability. These elements are concentrated at the climax of the funeral, that of the Generalissimo, who has died since the war's finish and is now being buried with all the pomp and flourish the state can provide. As he is proclaimed a Marshal of France and eulogized by a prominent man of letters there is an interruption:

there was a sudden movement, surge, in the crowd to one side; the hats and capes and lifted batons of policemen could be seen struggling toward the disturbance. But before they could reach it, something burst suddenly out of the crowd — not a man but a mobile and upright scar, on crutches, he had one arm and one leg, one entire side of his hatless head was one hairless eyeless and earless scar, he wore a filthy dinner jacket from the left breast of which depended on their barber-pole ribbons a British Military Cross and a Distinguished Conduct Medal, and a French *Médaille Militaire* . . .

With careless defiance and laughter "not triumphant: just indomitable," the Runner hurls the Corporal's medal on the Generalissimo's caisson. His pronouncements on the dead leader uttered before the mob reaches him acidly summarize the values for which that man stood. The very fact that they are popular slogans and clichés brings home the indictment of our civilization:

his voice ringing in the aghast air as the crowd rushed down upon him:
"You too helped carry the torch of man into that twilight where he shall

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be no more; these are his epitaphs: They shall not pass. My country right or wrong. Here is a spot which is forever England —"

Bigotry, jingoism, procrustean morality, and imperialism, these are the causes of human regression; war is their beneficial companion.

But the Runner, as he promised, does not die. Caught between the guns of his own army and the Germans in a selfless gesture of peace he was wrapped in a sheet of flame and yet survived. This was a baptism of fire, Faulkner's re-telling of the arrival of the Holy Spirit. Like Eliot's Tiresias in *The Waste Land* (a poem that makes its own charges against contemporary civilization, though we have so far tamed it in the classroom as to delete its moral force) who has lost his physical sight only to receive the gifts of vision and prophecy, the Runner has been chastened in the flesh and simultaneously had conferred upon him the reward of immortality. We are not surprised, then, to learn that he escapes real harm from the mob of attackers. Lying in the gutter of a side street cradled in the arms of the Quartermaster General he laughs at the surrounding faces and speaks to that old man:

"That's right," he said: "Tremble, I'm not going to die. Never."

"I'm not laughing," the old man bending over him said. "What you see are tears."

The Runner has been transformed into a mythical figure, too, and belongs in large part to the realm of the Corporal, a realm of transcendence. Yet he remains also basically, even grotesquely, human and fully capable of carrying on in the world. The wounds he bears fuse his identity symbolically with that of the race horse whose story first started him on the way that led to this point, both are "runners." Resolute and mocking, his indestructability makes him the purveyor of faith in humanity. We recall that Levine the aviator loses his determination and the meaning behind it with the discovery of war's contrivance; he finally removes himself, bewildered, through suicide. But the Runner takes on life, ultimately more than life, embodying it in his comic particularity and in the shadow he casts.

Laughter provides the Runner's only suitable weapon: it refuses defeat and penetrates any barrier raised against it. His spectral voice outlasts the Generalissimo's subtle one which is limited by the latter's mortality. The essence of Faulkner's moral and artistic view rests in this complete abandon to the human cause. Man may persevere in two opposed ways: either as victim of his own denials and irresponsibilities, or as a creature who, cognizant of his position, attains to full stature in the teeth of all threats of annihilation. His earthly immortality lies in the second choice only. Faulkner has discussed this in an interview:

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Man wants to be braver than he is. He wants to have more compassion than he has. Suddenly, sometimes, he finds that he *is* more brave and more honest. He does stand up and say that this injustice shall no longer prevail, and then he does something so that it shall no longer prevail. Man does things at times that make it seem that he is not worthy of surviving. But he redeems himself at other times. He will prevail.¹

In a sense the Corporal's actions have taken place in the conscience of every character in the book, with different results. As a myth discloses some important aspect of existence, so his sacrifice reawakens knowledge of its prototype and suddenly illuminates for each man his individual possibilities. Within this light each must make his choice and pursue the goal which it opens up. Viewed from one angle the Runner is doomed to endless repetitions of the novel's last scene because his task is never done. But, we understand, he has always to carry forward, however small the gain, before God, the energy of man's hope.

¹*Accent* (Summer, 1956), p. 172.

Psychology, The Problematic Science

JOSEPH HAVENS

The science of psychology has reached adolescence. It is in the midst of a critical struggle for self-identity (in what sense is it "science"? what is its legitimate subject matter?); it frequently leans heavily on its elders (physics and biology) and its peers (sociology, cultural anthropology) for guidance and information; and it is still in search of adequate "coping mechanisms" to handle its ever-changing "world" (what methods of investigation are both scientific and yet not overly reductive?). But before attempting any prognoses regarding maturity, it will be helpful to survey a few recent developments.

An important symposium on the problem of motivation and the control of behavior — a persistent and central issue for psychologists — is a good place to begin (APA Symposium, 1958). Neal Miller of Yale reviews in competent fashion studies attempting to correlate various kinds of changes in the brain or other bodily organs with behavioral change; he deals particularly with the effects of experimental brain lesion, electrical stimulation, administration of drugs, and other biochemical intervention. One recent study (Olds, 1958) will suggest the kind of correlations being made. Dr. James Olds, a physiologist turned psychologist, permanently implanted electrodes in different sections of the brains of rats. Each rat was placed in an experimental situation such that the rat could, by pressing a bar, cause an electric current to pass from the electrodes through a particular portion of the brain. With electrodes in certain areas, the rat received "pleasure" sensations, and proceeded to press the bar many times more frequently than would a rat under normal conditions. With electrodes in other areas, bar-avoidance behavior was noted, and some kind of "pain" stimulus was assumed to occur. Rats receiving pleasurable sensations would endure electric shocks to the feet or learn complex mazes to receive the "reward" of self-stimulation. The author states that such data help us to move toward a unification "between electrophysiological independent variables and standard behavioral, dependent variables."

Theory based on the rapidly increasing number of brain-behavior studies such as Olds' has not proceeded far as yet. Perhaps the outstanding psychological theorist in this area is Donald O. Hebb of McGill University (Hebb, 1949, 1958). Hebb's basic working assumption is that mind is an aspect or expression of brain activity. His problem has been to explain psychological "mediating processes"

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(attention, thinking, memory) which occur between the reception of an external stimulus (e.g., a problem) and a response which may not occur for hours or weeks later. Hebb suggests a model or construct of "assemblies" of brain cells, in which electric circuits "reverberate" so long as the mediating process is occurring. With an extrapolation of the theory to embrace groups of simultaneously active cell assemblies, such variables as attitude, value, and even "free will" can be hypothetically explained. In a popular exposition of the implication of such views as Hebb's for the traditional mind-body problem, the physiologist R. W. Gerard (Gerard, 1959) states that "... it remains inconceivable in the light of our present knowledge that conscious experience can direct the material events in the brain. Rather, the active neurones and synapses seem to be responsible for both behavior and consciousness" (Gerard, p. 82).

In the same symposium on control of behavior (APA Symposium, 1958), B. F. Skinner takes a decidedly non-biological and strictly psychological approach to motivation. Taking his leads from Pavlov and early behaviorists he has gone far beyond them both in the range of phenomena to which behavioristic concepts can be applied, and in the degree of control over behavior which can be demonstrated. He has freed conditioning from its narrow Pavlovian framework and demonstrated that almost any response which can be performed at all can be elicited and controlled by proper scheduling of reinforcements. This "shaping" of behavior has been carried on so far mostly with pigeons, rats and monkeys, but Skinner has written much in lucid fashion indicating its implications and applications for human behavior (Skinner, 1953). He believes that "the world in which man lives may be regarded as an extraordinarily complex set of positive and negative reinforcing contingencies." In *Walden Two* (Skinner, 1948) he has described the fantasied application of the Skinnerian principles of conditioning to create a modern scientific utopia. His *Verbal Behavior* (Skinner, 1957) is a highly ingenious account, based on some experimental data, of the way in which principles of reinforcement and punishment may explain both speech and covert symbolic processes.

B. F. Skinner's is only one of several points of view concerning the laws governing the learned behavior of organisms. For general reading in this area, the reader is referred to Ernest Hilgard's *Theories of Learning* (Hilgard, 1956).

Where the Implications Lead Us

The implications of the above for the Christian are too many and too involved to be developed here. Suffice it to point out that a viewpoint of bio-social determinism is maintained by all these writers and that the mind-body problem tends to be resolved in the direction indicated by Gerard. The brain-behavior studies have pointed to a greater role of the lower brain centers in man's "higher thought processes" than we had imagined; Hebb cites studies (APA

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Symposium, 1958; Heron, 1957) which dramatize how dependent human subjects are on continual stimulation from the outside to maintain their psychic balance. Such evidence seems to favor an image of man as a biological organism, extraordinarily dependent on a favorable electro-chemical internal environment for maintaining his sanity and his very humanness.

For an ingenious and informed attempt to relate and reconcile the assumptions of scientific psychology with those of orthodox (Missouri Synod Lutheran) Christianity, see the chapters by Paul Meehl in *What, Then, Is Man?* (1958).

When we turn to those psychologists who prefer to start their investigations with man himself rather than the lower vertebrates, and who try to deal with the full complexity of his personality and his peculiarly human behavior, we encounter a somewhat different view. There are of course neo-behaviorist psychologists who extrapolate from stimulus-response theory to human personality; they tend to make the S-R unit of *habit* the "building block" of personality (Dollard and Miller, 1950). Views of personality more congenial to the religious person have grown up particularly around Harvard University. Here the names of Henry A. Murry and Gordon Allport are most well-known; both of these men, and many of their co-workers, have insisted on dealing with personality as a Gestalt which must be studied longitudinally (i.e., through years of development, including adulthood) as well as cross-sectionally; and they have tried to correct for Freudian distortions (though, at least in Murray's case, without discarding Freud, Jung, et al.) by insisting on the study of "normal" persons. Robert W. White's *Lives in Progress* (White, 1952) is perhaps the best introduction to this approach. A significant attempt to relate beliefs and attitudes to personality variables within this same general approach to personality is *Opinions and Personality* (Smith, Bruner and White, 1956). Allport's basic theory is contained in his comprehensive *Personality* (Allport, 1937) and *Patterns and Growth in Personality* (Allport, 1961). He deals with the issues of particular relevance to religion in *Becoming* (Allport, 1955) and in his *The Individual and His Religion* (Allport, 1950), a study of "the religious sentiment." In *Becoming*, Allport lays great stress on the importance of a concept of self as the necessary center for any psychology fully adequate to man. He deals sympathetically with the need for man to affirm his freedom, the values of democracy, and the possibility of a unifying and self-fulfilling religious life. His formulation of "self" (including even the ineffable "knower") provides a bridge between scientific psychology and certain considerations of ontology or Being in philosophy and theology.

Theories of the Self

Carl R. Rogers, best known as the genius behind non-directive or client-centered psychotherapy, has also developed a theory of the self and of interpersonal relations congenial to religious thought (Rogers, 1951; Koch, 1959,

Vol. III, pp. 184 ff.). In Rogers' view, conscious experience is organized into a self or self-concept and becomes the center of personality and the significant agent guiding behavior. The valuing process and the course of interpersonal relations likewise take their direction from this center. Rogers has also struggled to define the basic conditions under which men can grow to full psychological maturity, either in therapy or outside it, and has tried in several ways to formulate the meaning of love ("being deeply understood and deeply accepted," "unconditional positive regard"). Rogers' attempts to grapple with the problem of freedom have been honest and searching and he refuses to accept any oversimple solution, or one which in any way is not confirmed by his own experience (Rogers and Skinner, 1956; Rogers, 1955).

Carl Rogers bases his construct of "self" on what has recently been named (perhaps misnamed) "the phenomenological approach" to the gathering of psychological data (Snygg & Combs, 1949; Kuenzli, 1959). The use of the data of self-report has always existed in some area of psychology (e.g., sensation and perception), but the defense and legitimizing of it in the study of personality is relatively recent; the implications of this development for the psychological study of religious experience are evident. There are indications that the field of social psychology is moving in a similar direction; the point of view of Solomon E. Asch is the best example (Asch, 1952; Koch, 1959, Vol. III, pp. 363 ff.). Asch objects to the application of notions taken from the study of lower organisms to human social settings "without a serious effort to demonstrate their relevance under the new conditions." He proceeds to urge the inclusion of "mental happenings" or the experience of the subjects in social psychological data. One problem for which this has important implications is that of the existence of "group mind." Asch rejects the concept of group mind as a mystical entity participated in by all members of the group, but he does insist that all of us *perceive* groups as acting as entities. These perceptions of the group and "its" actions differ to some extent from one group member to another, but they are nonetheless of tremendous significance in the analysis of group behavior. Such an approach allows one to take account of genuine concern for "the welfare of the group" on the part of individual members, a variable which is consistently left out of account in current studies of group behavior. This is only one illustration of the way in which Asch tries to take account of "what it is to be human" in his approach to social psychology.

Though psychologists operate with unexamined values at many points, they have tried to come to terms with them explicitly in defining "mental health." The most careful thinkers in this area (Jahoda, 1958; M. B. Smith, 1959) have gone far beyond the criteria of "normality," "adjustment," or "absence of mental illness," and are seeking sophisticated answers more appropriate to the complexity of human values and less dependent on a particular culture. Although a few "frontal assaults" on the problem have been tried (e.g., Maslow, 1954, Chapter 12),

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the most solid contributions to date have been attempts to draw together, organize and interrelate criteria arising from clinical work (e.g., self-acceptance), from the study of personality (e.g., integration, balance of psychic forces), or from other sources. These writers believe that "positive mental health" is not a unitary concept or state of being, but that there are probably several types of mental health, and that the price paid for an especially high level of health in one of them may be a lower level in another. Thus, for example, William Blake might score high on the criterion of "self-actualization," low on "accurate perception of reality." Smith believes that the best answers in the long run will come from a more adequate understanding of human personality. Both Jahoda and Smith are clear that a fuller knowledge of what *is* can never finally settle what *ought to be*. However, Smith feels that when we comprehend more fully the development of personality and the many forms "self-actualization" may take, we will then see more clearly *goals* of personality development which may indirectly illuminate the problem of positive mental health. Both writers are clear that mental health is not a *summum bonum*, a synonym for the "good life," but that it is only one goal among many, and that it should "compete with other values in the area of personal and social choice" (Smith, 1959).

The Psychoanalytic Tradition

Further to the left among psychologists are a group of men almost polemically concerned with the study of "creativity, love, self-actualization, high values, ego-transcendence, autonomy, responsibility," etc. They draw heavily upon the psychoanalytical tradition, existentialism, and the insights of philosophy, religion, and the humanities in general. They have organized an American Association of Humanistic Psychology and have begun to publish a *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*. Their point of view is well characterized by the writings of Erich Fromm, A. H. Maslow, and Rollo May. May is identified with recent developments in "existential psychotherapy" in the United States and is particularly critical of the tendency to reduce the human person to "an object," which he finds both in the orthodox psychoanalytic tradition and in psychological science generally. May was originally a Christian minister who entered the field of psychology and psychotherapy through pastoral counseling. Of particular interest to religionists are recent writings of A. H. Maslow dealing with Agape love (Maslow, 1954, Chapter 13; Maslow, 1955), and with the mystical experience (Maslow, 1959). Most psychologists consider the writings of such "humanistic psychologists" as speculative and unsupported by empirical data; nonetheless they are undoubtedly providing an important corrective for contemporary American psychology and may be the source of both the hypotheses and the impetus for more solid research in these areas.

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A brief word about the field of the "psychology of religion" is in order, especially since its long winter of dormancy seems to be drawing to a close. Walter Houston Clark's *Psychology of Religion* (Clark, 1958) is the best recent survey of the field. James E. Dittes's two reviews of works in the area (Dittes, 1958, 1960) point out the one-sidedness of the William James-Gordon Allport tradition and suggest that many findings in the fields of developmental, abnormal, social and personality psychology are of greater relevance to the study of religion than we are aware. Much recent stimulus in the area comes from the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion; the journal of this organization, the first issue of which is due in 1961, hopefully will contain many of the psychological studies predicted by Dittes.

Two other journals referred to above, *Contemporary Psychology* (a journal of reviews) and *The American Psychologist* (the journal of the profession), are recommended to the Christian interested in psychology. From the side of psychotherapy and psychiatry *Psychiatry, A Journal for the Study of Inter-personal Relations* is probably the most useful.

The adolescent struggles mentioned in the first paragraph are apparent today in the publication of a stupendous seven-volume self-analysis entitled *Psychology: Study of a Science* (Koch, 1959). The highly competent editor of this symposium summarizes a sentiment which he notes in many of the contributors to the first three volumes: "There is a longing . . . for psychology to embrace — by whatever means may prove feasible — problems over which it is possible to feel intellectual passion . . . (Psychology) seems ready to think contextually, freely, and creatively about its own refractory subject matter, and to work its way free from a dependence on simplistic theories of correct scientific conduct" (Koch, Volume III, p. 783). The Christian who believes there is some connection between man as a Christian and man as the subject of scientific study may be heartened by these words. It is hoped that the references of this article provide some documentation for this viewpoint.

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The « New » Psychological Liberty

O. HOBART MOWRER

The title for this paper is taken from a remarkable book by Dr. David Bakan — *Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition*¹ — in which the author argues with considerable plausibility that Freud conceived himself as a sort of latter-day messiah or savior whose mission it was to redeem the world from the moral bondage into which it was plunged by the ancient Hebrew people and the Mosaic Law. This Law, when internalized in the form of conscience or “superego,” provides, according to Freud, the basis for all man’s psychic disorders and not a small segment of his social problems as well. Following Schiller, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and other 19th-century German philosophers, Freud held that, to quote Dr. Bakan: “The disease of the neurotic is his guilt. This guilt is, in itself, an evil and its removal is good. . . . If God is the guilt-producing image, then the Devil is the counter force” (p. 233). Hence Bakan takes seriously, in at least a metaphorical way, the notion — for which there is indeed some empirical evidence — that Freud identified himself with the Devil and that not only individual therapy but also the broad cultural reforms at which he aimed were, in at least the historical sense of the term, a Devilish enterprise.

The Devil, or at least the principles which the Devil concept embodies, “is then a cure for despair” (p. 236). And Freud and those coming after him were to effect a great human transformation and liberation by diametrically reversing Mosaic morality and showing that health, pleasure, and even virtue, in a new perspective, will come not from observance of the Mosaic Law but by its disregard. “Thus Freud plays the role of a new Moses who comes down with a new Law dedicated to personal psychological liberty,” says Bakan (p. 329). “One of the critical features of Messianism,” he goes on to say, “is its goal of leading people out of slavery and oppression. Freud’s whole effort at the creation of psychoanalysis may be viewed as Messianic in this respect” (p. 170).

In a book entitled *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion*,² I have already discussed Professor Bakan’s startling thesis in some detail and do not wish to repeat the same observations here; but it should be said in passing that Bakan,

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¹Princeton, N.J., 1958: D. Van Nostrand Co.

²D. Van Nostrand, 1961.

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surprisingly enough, writes not as a critic but as one who, like so many others in our time, feels that Freud was not only an inspired scientific genius but, in the Wagnerian sense, a Universal Hero as well.

I

The specific impetus for this paper comes, however, not from the Bakan argument (I allude to it here only as background), but from a series of experiences which I have recently had that seem to me to highlight our contemporary moral situation in other equally remarkable and disconcerting ways.

A few weeks ago I was invited to address a group of psychiatric social workers, and, as it turned out, there was in the audience a medical psychoanalyst who in the discussion which followed took it upon himself, in the usual calm Olympian way, to set us all straight. "The whole problem of psychopathology," he asserted, "comes down to the fact that society is irrational. It puts *quite unnecessary restrictions* on instinctual gratification and in so doing not only produces neurosis and psychosis but also delinquency, crime, and even war itself. And the only solution is to overthrow and once for all scrap all of these unnecessary, archaic, irrational features of social control and personal limitation. Each individual should and, if not fettered and frustrated by arbitrary restrictions, *would* practice the Golden Rule. Organized society is therefore an abomination; and our only hope of sanity, to say nothing of happiness, is to overthrow it and give man, as the biological organism he indubitably is, relief from his present terrible burdens and restrictions and at least a fighting chance to be what he was intended to be."

It is not difficult to see why this perception of the problem was originated by a physician and often appeals to and is accepted by other physicians. Trained as they are in the *biological* sciences, they are immediately at home with a theory which reduces man's most exquisite personal anguish to a cultural impairment of normal biological functioning; and since we cannot change man's biology, they conclude that the only alternative is to modify his culture, his sociology.

The reactions of the *social* workers (note the qualifying adjective!) at the meeting alluded to was interesting. Most of them had, of course, been heavily indoctrinated with Freudian ideas when they were in training; and there was still in the group a good deal of head nodding and exchanging of knowing looks when the analyst spoke. However, other members of the group either disregarded his remarks as boring reiteration of a trite and sterile theme or else took lively issue with him. For myself the points which seem most important in this connection are the following.

II

Although much of the prestige which psychoanalysis has achieved comes from its pretensions as Science, its acceptance really presupposes a surprising scientific naïveté, especially in regard to history and the social sciences. If the advocates of analysis were familiar with the principle of *functionalism* in both anthropology and sociology, they would know how generally accepted in these disciplines is the view that social regulations are never adopted and maintained capriciously. Although undeniably costly in some respects, such regulations, according to this principle, have been found in protracted human experience to be the lesser of two evils; and it is often the very fact that a regulation is working *so well* that makes us lose sight of the greater evil which it replaces and thus prompts us to regard it as unnecessary, adventitious, and arbitrary. This is not to say, of course, that circumstances may not alter through time so that a proscription which was once "functional" no longer is, or that genuinely unsatisfactory solutions to social problems are not sometimes attempted. Also we know that there is such a thing as social and economic exploitation. In all such instances, considered, orderly (or even disorderly) change is called for, and usually occurs. But this is very far from the contention that *regulations per se* are evil and their repudiation the condition of psychic wholeness and social utopia. Actually, in a Democratic society such as our own the great danger is that we will be *too* self-indulgent, too laissez-faire, too tolerant and not enough disposed toward planful renunciation and a disciplined way of life. Yet the analyst whom I have quoted would have us believe the exact opposite, that we are flaying and fairly destroying ourselves with "quite unnecessary restrictions on instinctual gratification!"

Anthropologists, even those who perhaps find themselves in sympathy with some of Freud's theorizing, are generally agreed that in all human societies, civilized and primitive alike, social control is obligatory in at least *two* areas: namely, in the expression and patterning of sexuality and in the control of aggression, precisely the impulses whose "repression" Freud singles out as the source of all our troubles.* Paradoxically, at a time when it is becoming ever more apparent that if the world is to survive we must have not less but *more* control of aggression, we Americans are still intrigued by the idea that *sexual* regulation is inimical and must go. In other words, while trying to extend what the anthropologists call the in-group (or peace) principle from sovereign nations to the world as a whole, we continue to take seriously Freud's captious and equally irresponsible admonitions in the domain of sex, despite widespread social and historical indications to the contrary.

*See especially, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1930).

III

A few weeks ago I came across an unusually clear, succinct, and (so far as I can judge) objective account of the efforts which the Old Bolsheviks made, following the Russian revolution of 1917, to put into practice the teachings of that other great would-be emancipator Karl Marx, and his collaborator Frederick Engels. In his book *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, published in 1902,⁴ Engels declared that monogamy was just another vestige of the iniquitous capitalistic system and would disappear with "the transformation of the means of production into collective property" (p. 53).⁵ In traditional marriage women, he held, are in effect property and their emancipation would follow as a matter of course with the abolition of private ownership. "We are now approaching," he wrote, "a social revolution in which the old economic foundations of monogamy will disappear just as surely as those of its complement, prostitution" (p. 53). And his culminating argument for the dissolution of marriage and the conventional type of family was: "If marriage founded on love is alone moral, then it follows that marriage is moral only as long as love lasts" (p. 53).

Since Engel's book was law with the Bolsheviks as far as the institution of marriage was concerned, it is not surprising that, with the success of the revolution of 1917 assured, efforts were quickly and systematically made to put his teachings into effect. For detailed documentation of the way in which this was carried out, I refer the reader to Nicholas S. Timasheff's 1946 book, *The Great Retreat*,⁶ but the salient facts of the case are these. Divorce, which had previously been difficult to obtain in Russia, became extremely easy; a postal card notifying the other partner that the relationship was ended would suffice. "Incest, bigamy, and adultery were dropped from the list of official crimes [and] abortion was explicitly permitted by the decree of November 20, 1920" (p. 56).⁷ No distinction was made between the status of children born legitimately and illegitimately, nonregistered co-habitation was given the same legal status as registered co-habitation, parental authority over children was systematically weakened, and additional measures were taken "to uproot the traditional structure of the family."

Here, surely, was an effort to eliminate "the unnecessary restrictions on instinctual gratification" which was about as radical and thoroughgoing as anything that the psychoanalyst cited earlier in this paper, or anyone else, could ask for. Short of sanctioning homosexuality and the other perversions, the government

⁴Translated by E. Untermann. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Son.

⁵Page references for this and the ensuing excerpts from the Engels' book appear in N. W. Bell & E. F. Vogel, *A Modern Introduction to the Family* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960).

⁶New York: E. P. Dutton Co.

⁷Page references refer to the Bell & Vogel book cited in footnote 5.

had gone about as far as it could, it would seem, in guaranteeing complete sexual liberty. But American advocates of this expedient are careful not to tell us, or perhaps do not even know, what the *outcome* of the Russian experiment was. By 1935, roughly 18 years after the introduction of Engels' ideas on sex and the family, Soviet policy makers were in full retreat from their original aims and aspirations in this area. Says Timasheff:

Dissolution of family ties, especially of the parent-child relations, threatened to produce a wholesale dissolution of community ties, with rapidly increasing juvenile delinquency as the main symptom. In 1935, the Soviet papers were full of information and indignation about the rise of hooliganism, i.e., of crimes in which the sadistic joy of inflicting pain on somebody or destroying something of value was paramount. Everywhere, wrote the papers, gangs invaded workingmen's dwellings, ransacked them, and destroyed or spoiled what they did not take away; if somebody dared to resist, he was mercilessly killed. In trains, the hooligans sang obscene songs; to prolong the fun, they did not permit travelers to alight at their destinations if they had not finished singing. Sometimes the schools were besieged by neglected children; other times gangs beat the teachers and attacked women, or regularly fought against one another (p. 58).

Finally, the magnificent slogans of the liberation of sex and the emancipation of women proved to have worked in favor of the strong and reckless, and against the weak and shy. Millions of girls saw their lives ruined by Don Juans in Communist garb, and millions of children had never known parental homes (p. 61).

The disintegration of the family did not disturb the Communists, since this was precisely what they wanted to achieve, but they *were* disturbed by quite a few collateral effects of the disorganization (p. 58).

By way of describing the reforms which Soviet leaders eventually instigated, Timasheff reports that freedom of divorce was first curtailed and then almost abolished. Abortion was made illegal and marriage was once again idealized. Also, "The peculiar parent-child relationship which had obtained under the Communist experiment, and which granted superiority to the children, was reversed to one which is considered normal in the world; once more, children have to recognize the authority of their parents" (p. 62).

And in 1939, the official journal of the Union Prosecutor declared: "Sound moral ideas must be inculcated into the minds of young persons. They must know that lack of care for their parents is found only among savages and that in every civilized society such conduct is considered dishonest and base" (p. 62).

We have, of course, had scattered intimations of this dramatic turn of events in Russia; but the foregoing is the most systematic and sobering account of it

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I have personally seen. It is, moreover, independently confirmed by the reactions of Russian visitors to the campus of the university where I teach. Uniformly the young men who have been our guests have expressed disapproval and disgust at the prevalence and flagrancy of the intensive petting that goes on among our students, at the vulgarity of the cover pictures on the paperbacks sold in drugstores and on newstands, and by the tenor of our arts and literature in general. We condemn the Russians for their "materialism" and godlessness and preen ourselves on our Christian ideals; but it is fair to say that as between the amount of time and effort directed to the *mind*, as opposed to the body, the Russians are today quite possibly our clear superiors.

In any case, the fact stands that they were compelled to beat an undignified retreat from the brave new sexual ethic which they inaugurated during the first decade or two of the Communist regime. In the front of his monumental *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*,^{*} William L. Shirer quotes Santayana to the effect that those who do not know history "are condemned to relive it." The moral of this observation applies, surely, not only to our need to know and never forget the ghastly ideological and human errors of National Socialism, but also to the experiences of the Russians in their ill-fated repudiation of "Bourgeois" sexual morality, with consequences so destructive that it will take decades, if not generations, to undo them completely.

IV

A few years ago Walt Disney released one of his excellent nature films entitled "Seal Island." Located somewhere in the Pribilofs, this place is the breeding grounds for large numbers of Pacific fur seals and, no less than the Russian experiment, has a mute but important message for us. At one end of the island the great bull seals gather their harems and restlessly police and defend them against each other. Here, aside from the incessant vigilance and recurrent fighting, is a sort of seal heaven in the classical Moslem manner. But the Disney movie also takes us to what is referred to as "bachelor quarters" at the other end of the island. Here are large numbers of young males which have not yet been, or perhaps will never be, able to establish themselves on the breeding grounds proper; and with them is also a liberal sprinkling of old monarchs which have fallen, or perhaps just decided that sex is not worth what it costs! All told, there are probably five males which are thus deprived of "instinctual gratification" for every one that achieves it. Here, among the reigning bulls is instinctual "freedom," in both sex and aggression, at its primeval best; and yet we can hardly see the picture as a pretty one. It is not hard to imagine that it was, in fact, some such grim predicament as this, far back in human history, that led to the "invention"

^{*}New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960.

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of monogamy. And what a revolutionary achievement it must have seemed: a female for *every* male—and vice versa! Today we fret and inveigh against this arrangement; but surely the fact is that by means of this odious form of "restriction" the total amount of sexual activity, per capita, is several times greater than it is on idyllic Seal Island. Besides, monogamy undoubtedly reduces in-group aggression and permits a degree of social solidarity and integration which would otherwise be quite out of the question. Those who would have us believe otherwise rather obviously have something to "sell," which, ultimately, turns out to be our very civilization.

Of late it has been argued that unsanctioned pregnancies and venereal disease are the principal reasons for our traditional sexual ethic and that as birth-control measures and prophylactics are perfected, the justification for most hetero-sexual prohibitions will collapse. It cannot be denied that these have been, and still are, important considerations. But even if they should be completely eliminated, it is by no means certain that the necessity for restraint and regulation would disappear. We have agreed that the situation on Seal Island is not a particularly happy one, yet it is doubtful if seals are in the least concerned about either illegitimacy or contagion. In other words, quite aside from these considerations, it would appear that there are still other factors which give to monogamy strong justification. Besides, as already noted, monogamy is *not* basically restrictive; rather it is a means of insuring maximal sexual opportunity and gratification, with minimal group disorder and disruption. Shaw, with his wonderful sense of paradox, observes in one of his plays⁹ that marriage "is the most licentious of institutions." Those who would have us profane it — Kitty Kallen, in a recent article,¹⁰ says that the admonition of *her* analyst was to "act single" — may well find that their remedy for supposed sexual deprivation and neurosis actually exacerbates the very condition which they claim to alleviate.

V

But, to give the Devil his due, we must admit that if we abolished *all* moral restraint and obligation and idealism, we would, indeed, eliminate neurosis. Although it is probably not the inhibition of sex and hostility that makes us ill but, rather, their improper and hidden *expression*, the fact remains that conscience and the capacity for guilt are fundamental. However, if we attempt to solve the problem as many psychoanalysts would have us do, it is almost axiomatic that we would eliminate, alas, not only "neurosis" but the human enterprise itself. Somehow a less costly solution must be found, which is, it seems, to come to terms

⁹*Man and Superman*, Act 3.

¹⁰"My Lost Years in Psychoanalysis," *American Weekly*, March 6, 1960.

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with conscience and the social realities it represents, rather than try either to outwit or destroy it.

Not *all* psychoanalysts, it should be said, take the extreme and indefensible position attributed to them in the preceding pages. For example, in his book *Freud, Master and Friend*,¹¹ Hanns Sachs says: "This inheritance [of values and experience from the past] is always with us in the form of the super-ego, invisible, intangible, and yet the most indubitable reality that shapes our life. . . . We have no choice. We cannot reject our inheritance and return to animalism. Bargaining, trying to beat down the demands of the super-ego would be a sign of meanness" (151-152).

And this writer, whom Freud once referred to as his "best friend in America," exemplifies his point of view with the following story: "A Jewish coachman whips his horse mercilessly. Cruelty to animals is not a Jewish trait and the Jews who stand by entreat him to spare the poor beast; but he answers coolly: Since he has undertaken to be a horse, he must run" (p. 152). To which Sachs adds the unfinished sentence, "Since we have taken it upon ourselves to be men. . . ."

Freud himself, toward the end of his life, mellowed considerably in his social and personal philosophy. For example, on the next to the last page of his last book, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*,¹² he quotes a couplet from Goethe which, in translation, reads:

What thou has inherited from thy fathers,
Acquire it to make it thine.

This is a far cry from the spirit and temper of the man who, for example, wrote *Civilization and Its Discontents*. It is therefore not surprising that many psychoanalysts prefer the Freud of the middle years to the "Old Freud," whom they regard as senile and not the *real* Freud. Soon we must, it seems, decide *which* of these two Freuds we are going to listen to.

VI

Although I have been psychoanalyzed three times, read virtually everything Freud has written, and was, for a period of some fifteen years, professionally and scientifically identified with the psychoanalytic movement, it is today sometimes alleged that I really do not "understand" Freud. If this be true, then it can be said that Freud did not understand *himself*; for, as I have just shown, there was also a tacit repudiation by Freud in his later years of much that he had said and written earlier. No, I think it is not a matter of "misunderstanding" on either

¹¹Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1944.

¹²New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1949.

Freud's part or my own, but of a genuine and profound *change* of mind, born of inescapable psychological and social realities. But let me, in any case, consider somewhat more specifically the charge itself.

On various other occasions I have taken the position that psychoanalysis came into existence because the Protestant Reformation very largely robbed Western man of clear and effective means of resolving personal guilt.¹³ Under the theology of Luther and, more particularly, that of Calvin, man is told that he is fully responsible for his sins but is quite helpless to do anything about his salvation. And Freud's evil genius has consisted, not of restoring man to what may be called double responsibility — for both one's sins and one's salvation — but of promulgating the doctrine of double *irresponsibility*, namely, the view that neurotic (sinful) man is indeed unable to help himself ("help" is possible only through psychoanalysis), but neither should he hold himself accountable for having gotten into such a state in the first place.

This general position has been sharply criticized by some on the grounds that Freud, for all his emphasis upon the principle of psychic determinism, did not really propound a philosophy of irresponsibility, that, in point of fact, he taught a very exalted conception of responsibility. The argument, more fully developed, goes something like this. Responsibility, or virtue, "under the law," is not virtue at all — it is compulsion, bondage; and it is only the individual who has been able (or "helped") to throw off the rule of conscience and compunction and become "ego syntonic" that is truly mature, responsible, rational, free. Decisions are now made, not on the basis of what one has been told or trained to do, but on the alleged basis of realism and rationality.

And in practice what is the *criterion* of the realistic, the rational? Very commonly it turns out to be whatever will give us *pleasure*, provided only that it "will not hurt anyone else," at least not very much. It is true that in 1911, Freud wrote a very penetrating paper on "Two Principles in Mental Functioning,"¹⁴ in which he clearly distinguished between what he termed the pleasure principle and the reality principle, but in much of his later theorizing he largely lost sight of this paper and most of his followers seem never to have heard of it. At any rate, the "fully analyzed" person is supposed to be able to take morality into his own hands and to regard as "strictly his own business" many areas of conduct which have traditionally been under active social control and the occasion, when violated, for strong guilt and remorse.

With our democratic and politically liberal traditions in this country, it was natural that we should have been attracted by this bold philosophy and, it might seem, new expression of human courage. Semantically, at least, there do indeed

¹³See *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion*; also, "The Rediscovery of Moral Responsibility," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 1961, 208, 88-91.

¹⁴*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 13-21.

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seem to be certain parallels here between our political beliefs and these psychological theories. But let us not overlook an important difference. Democracy implies that we are, to be sure, at liberty to express an *opinion* and to cast a *vote*; but, when all is said and done, we are *in our conduct* henceforth bound by the expressed will of the majority.

This, manifestly, is not quite what the more ardent advocates of greater "instinctual gratification" have in mind. They really embrace a philosophy which says that we are *not* subject to the will, the decisions, the dictates of the majority, but may instead take matters into our own hands and decide all things for ourselves, subject only to consideration of what is good for *us*, and not too manifestly destructive for others. Thus freed of compulsion, from the dictates of community and conscience, everyone will then, we are told, follow the Golden Rule, thus ushering in a universal reign of good will and, simultaneously, much freer and fuller "instinctual gratification." Surely an exhibit of utopian pipe-dreaming if ever there was one! It is fairly obvious that the instinct of hostility and aggression cannot be "satisfied" without "hurting" anyone else—this is what aggression, at least in its more direct, undisguised form, is! Therefore, the greater instinctual gratification which is to be achieved comes down, rather specifically, to *sexual* gratification. The next section will be devoted to a more detailed consideration of this particular aspect of the problem.

VII

Already we have seen what sexual "freedom" means — and *costs* — on Seal Island, and we have also alluded to the anarchy and social demoralization to which it led in the early years of the great Russian experiment. I would like now to bring the discussion somewhat closer home.

A colleague of mine sees a good many college students in a counseling relationship; and he says that a very common story is that of the young woman who, in coming to college, is for the first time away from home and the immediate supervision of her parents and decides that what she does sexually, since it's not going to "hurt" anyone else, is *her* business. But when, as a result of this enlightened and emancipated policy, pregnancy, disease, or scandal results, she quickly discovers that she is by no means "alone" in her involvement. Relatives and friends are also deeply distressed and, even if none of these untoward events occur, there is at the very least the probability that illicit sexuality will produce a painful rupture between the girl and her parents and a fissioning within her own personality. As girls themselves often put the matter, their sexual guilt, whatever it may be, is compounded by the fact that they are now, in the bargain, hypocrites and liars. It is true, of course, that the sexually free and sophisticated girl is not *entirely* alone in her philosophy and way of life. Many movies and

plays, novels and advertisements give a kind of wry sanction to the "new" sexual ethic; but when it comes down to the persons who matter and who can be expected to provide concrete and practical assistance when things go wrong, the realities seem to be pretty much what they have always been.

It is interesting to wonder, incidentally, just how much responsibility those who, slyly or blatantly, advocate the new freedom for young women feel they ought to take when this freedom boomerangs. I think we can confidently assume that the answer is, not much. Perhaps I am ill informed in this connection, but to the best of my knowledge movie producers, lurid novelists and artists, and perfume and liquor manufacturers do not commonly found or support lying-in homes for unwed mothers, protective services for illegitimate children, clinics for the treatment of venereal disease, or psychiatric services for those whose lives they have helped disorganize.

Recently I have been seeing a talented young professional man whose life situation raises many of the same issues in a little different way. The presenting picture was that he had been drinking much more than was good for him, "imposing upon" (as he put it) and embarrassing his friends when intoxicated, and not meeting his responsibilities in connection with his work. In his sober moments he realized that if this trend continued it would be only a matter of time until he would lose his very responsible and attractive position. He was, in fact, scheduled for an important promotion soon; and instead of feeling pleased and zestful about it, he was acutely apprehensive.

During our first interview this young man reported an accident in which he had been involved a few months ago and implied that this was what had unnerved him; but when I said it seemed to me that his symptoms bespoke a deeper source of disturbance, he acknowledged that there "was something," which in our second interview he manfully reported. Some three years earlier he had permitted himself to become involved homosexually with an older man whom he very much admired and liked. Although this was decidedly against his "better judgment" — he comes from an excellent family and he, himself, has a good reputation — he said the excitement and enthrallment "clouded out everything else," until the affair came to an end and he was left with only ashes and remorse. He felt he did not deserve the trust people were inclined to put in him or the preferment which his very real abilities and good work had won for him in his profession; he therefore began to drink excessively, disillusion his friends, neglect his work, and to feel, as he put it, that he was fighting for his very "survival" psychologically.

As he rose from his chair at the end of the second interview this man remarked that he already felt "*much better*," and he was now able, simply at my request, to leave off the drinking forthwith; he settled into his work again, and he manifested an active and sincere desire, in our ensuing talks, to find a way of further restoring his self-respect and social integrity which he had thus seriously impaired. I explained to him my feeling that in situations of this kind "treatment"

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may begin with a specialized "therapist" but that full recovery is achieved only in restoration to community in the ordinary, common sense of that term. Obviously, in entering into the homosexual venture, this young man had isolated, alienated himself from the "significant others" in his life and had created what Donald Crissy, in a different context, has called an "unsharable problem." He said that for a long time he had felt that he could "work this thing out" himself, but he had come to realize that this was an illusion, that he must have "help"; and he was now not too resistant to the idea that such help cannot come entirely from just one other person. The rupture is with conscience and community and reconciliation must be as broad as the implications of the mistaken act itself.

However, when it came to the concrete steps to be taken in this connection, there was a good deal of reservation. How could one justify, he wondered, saving oneself at the risk of disappointing, "hurting" others. A part of this concern was, of course, rationalization: as a rule I don't think other persons are "hurt" nearly so much by knowing the truth about a situation of this kind as they are by the continued effects of symptomatic (acting-out) behavior on the part of the disturbed person himself. Actually, such behavior always involves something of a mystery for others, and clarification commonly comes, to be sure, as something of a "shock," but also, once assimilated, as a distinct relief.

However, there is still a sense in which we do not "have the right" to hurt others as the condition of our own redemption. They have trusted and accepted us, so why should we now "let them down" and disappoint them. They, presumably, have done nothing to "deserve" such treatment, and it would seem shabby indeed to involve them for one's own selfish reasons. I do not in the least underestimate the legitimacy of this point of view, but I would ask those who advance it most strongly, what is the alternative? And I would also ask if the problem itself, as thus posed, does not involve an element of distortion. Does not the *real* betrayal of our kinsmen and friends come when we *enter* upon a path of secret wrongdoing rather than when we confess and *end* our folly?

Not infrequently we encounter problems in connection with physical health that can be solved only by surgery; admittedly a radical and far from pleasant procedure, it is nevertheless sometimes the *only* alternative to death or serious incapacity. We have not, I believe, sufficiently recognized the similarity of certain situations in the moral realm. Conventional religion and secular psychiatry have both held out the promise of "easy" solutions — divine forgiveness, in the one case, which is to be had merely for the asking, and insight and understanding, in the other, which can be bought by the hour. But Dietrich Bonhoeffer in his book *The Cost of Discipleship*¹⁰ castigates what he calls "the doctrine of cheap grace" in the churches; and there is growing distrust among psychologists and

¹⁰New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958.

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psychiatrists of what may be called, in like manner, the doctrine of "salvation by insight."

A decade or so ago an older psychologist remarked to me that, over the years, he had gradually come to the conclusion that resolution of serious conflict always requires "that we give up something." By its very nature conflict implies that we are holding onto incompatible goals, and resolution thereof can hardly ever come about unless we abandon one or the other of them. Is this principle not related to the *New Testament* admonition to seek one's life by (apparently) losing it? We can hardly expect to enjoy the good esteem of others while at the same time engaging in behavior which we ourselves know disqualifies us for that esteem. Surely the Apostle Paul was profoundly right when he observed that we are "all parts of one another."

VIII

I recall a student, some twenty years ago, having made a remarkable observation. A propos of something we were discussing in a course in child psychology, she said: "It just occurs to me that my grandmother probably uses the word *duty* at least ten times as often as I do." And from my own boyhood, more than forty years ago, I remember not infrequent reference to certain adults in the small community where we lived as men (and women) *of principle*. This expression, it seems, has also dropped out of common usage — today I believe we refer to such persons as "compulsive." What do these changes in our habits of speech signify?

Noah Webster liked to characterize laws as "those wise restraints that make men free." And the notion that we find peace and true selfhood only when we "surrender" to a power (or principle) "higher than ourselves" is, of course, inherent in both Judaism and Christianity, as indicated, for example, by these lines from a well known hymn:

Holy Spirit, Right Divine, truth within my conscience reign;
Be my King that I may be, firmly bound, forever free.

Regulations, I would repeat, are not intended to be, and in fact usually are not, retractive, but liberating. My family and I plan to have dinner together punctually at six o'clock, unless, of course, something unexpected happens in which event we try to report our predicament and make appropriate rearrangements. From one point of view this policy is restrictive, an imposition, a curtailment of "freedom" and "spontaneity." How much simpler and more "creative" it would be for us to show up for dinner anytime we choose — or not at all — depending upon the mood strikes us! Not really. We are agreed, I think, that the liberties which we thus forego are more than compensated for by other more genuine and important freedoms which a regular, and regulated, time of eating

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makes possible: freedom from distracting and time-consuming uncertainty and debate each day concerning a question to which a standardized, routine answer, subject to change on special occasions, is perfectly feasible. It also provides an opportunity for us to be a "family," which means sharing certain experiences, behavior, values.

In general, however, and as a people we have lost faith in the principle of small immediate sacrifice for greater, long-term gain — in a word, *morality*; and we are easy prey to the blandishments of those who would have us, in the words of Harry Golden, "enjoy, enjoy." The reasons for this deterioration of interest in moral principle are, I am sure, numerous and complex; but we can hardly escape being struck, in this connection, by the rapid decline in our time of confidence in and respect for the traditional sanctions of and rationale for morality. As a boy I was told that certain things were *wrong* because they were "against God's will" and, if persisted in, would take one straight to Hell. How effective and meaningful are such metaphysical assertions today?

On my desk before me, as I write, is a reprint of an article entitled "Post-Christian Man," in which the author says, in part:

Silently and quite imperceptibly, man has been disentangled from the Christian world view, set upon his own feet, and given a new vision of a natural universe. Heaven and hell disappeared; God became increasingly unimaginable and rather thoroughly unemployed; miracles were rationalized or evaporated; experience even of the subtlest sort was reduced to natural dimensions. Christianity became an idealistic ethic, the bulwark of respectability, and a convenient source of sanctifying success and prestige. . . . We are post-Christian.¹⁶

And who is the author of this callous diagnosis and judgment? Surely an enemy of organized religion and of everything that is sweet and reasonable. No, it is the Rev. Samuel H. Miller, Professor of Divinity and Dean of the Divinity School of Harvard University; and the article has, moreover, been widely read and quoted by other theologians for they know it has the undeniable stamp of authenticity.

I myself have been hopeful that a new perception and vitality would emerge in religion which would once more give meaning and substance to moral considerations, but I have reluctantly concluded that such a prospect is now exceedingly dim and that it is the secular sciences, which have done so much to topple the religious world view, that must take leadership in showing that even though certain great social and ethical truths have previously been sanctioned by a no longer supportable metaphysics, they nonetheless continue to be valid and humanly indispensable. Many current trends are pointing in this direction.

¹⁶*The Christian Scholar*, Winter, 1960, p. 265.

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There is a new and sober concern with the problem of human values. Science, we are discovering, especially social and psychological science, can no longer be "ethically neutral," in the sense of assuming or implying that values are, for the individual or the group, a matter of indifference. Once again we are recognizing that the human young have to be trained, as well as educated, i.e., shaped and directed in their development by the experience and wisdom of their elders, rather than being allowed to grow like Topsy. And we are at long last also realizing that personality disorganization, far from being alleviated by a doctrine of permissiveness and irresponsibility, is actively exacerbated thereby.

Ironically, at a moment in history when the Free World is looking to the United States for moral and ideological leadership with unprecedented urgency, we find ourselves bogged down in what has been aptly termed the "paralysis of analysis," both scientifically and psychologically. Be independent, "mature," self-sufficient, make your *own* rules, rise *above* community and convention, we have been admonished. The moral insensitivity of the sociopath and the "loftiness" of the paranoid give us individual exhibits of what we can expect from a society which, as a whole, adopts such a philosophy.

IX

Finally, I would suggest that our peril in this area is not merely hypothetical. The brain-washing of Westerners who have returned from Communist China to tell of this ordeal prompts one, at first, to wonder why so much time (often as much as three years) and intensive effort are put into an enterprise that seems, once the prisoner is released, so trivial and ephemeral in its consequences. But a book by Dr. Robert J. Lifton has just appeared, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*,¹⁷ in which we get a more penetrating look behind the curtains, so to say. Dr. Lifton, while living in Hong Kong, was able to have protracted conversations not only with released Westerners but also with Chinese; and it is in connection with the latter that his study proves most revealing. "Thought reform," we must remember, is not something which Chinese Communists inflict only on foreigners, nor is it something to which they themselves have been unwillingly subjected. Rather, as Dr. Lifton persuasively shows, it took root and spread throughout China itself in response to deep personal needs and a crisis in Chinese character and society. The background facts are somewhat intricate, but Dr. Lifton admirably summarizes the situation thus:

The interplay between Chinese intellectuals and Communism began, not in 1948, but in 1919, immediately following the Russian Revolution. From then on, Communism became linked with China's own continuous

¹⁷New York: W. W. Norton, 1961.

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revolution — emotionally, organizationally, and ideologically. Of all Chinese mass movements, Communism was most capable of harnessing the powerful emotions released in the youth-age cultural reversal. . . . Intellectuals of all shades of political opinion found in this theory a focal point for hostilities, a reassuring interpretation of a humiliating situation, a way to avoid the pain of their own struggles with shame and guilt by centering their accusatory emotions upon an outside enemy, and a rationale for rejecting that Western enemy even while borrowing his knowledge and methods (pp. 377-378).

Now let us note how Chinese Communists set about providing "therapy" (*their word*) for this inner turmoil and loss of personal identity:

As Mao himself explains: "The first method is to give the patients [again note the term !] a powerful stimulus, yell at them, 'You're sick !,' so that the patients will have a fright and break out in an over-all sweat; then, they can be carefully treated." The intellectual is reminded that he has inner conflicts (indeed they are made to seem worse than he thought they were); but the accompanying rationale gives him a feeling that Communist "doctors" possess both the knowledge of cause and the means of cure (pp. 380-381).

Then we learn, more specifically, the nature of the sickness. Dr. Lifton characterizes it thus:

The Chinese intellectual is vulnerable to the accusation of "individualism" — the most basic criticism, since in the eyes of the Communists it "sums up in one term the ideological characteristics of the petty bourgeois class" — on all identity fronts. When individualism is defined as "ultra-democratic ideology, tendency for independent action, *excess emphasis upon individual liberty*," it is obviously being directed at the Western liberal in him. When it is defined as "individual firstism" to include those who "both adulate and pull strings," he can feel its valid application to highly personalized acquisitive patterns which became so prominent during the transitional phase [between the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty, in 1911, and the modern era] (p. 381, *italics added*).

It goes without saying that we must not permit "individualism" and loss of social consciousness and commitment to reach the point that we, too, are ready to submit to "thought reform" in the Chinese manner. But the strident emphasis upon what I have referred to in this article as "the new psychological liberty" promises to take us precisely in this direction. It purports to "free" us from age-old limitations, but all indications are that the culmination of such liberation is group deterioration and personal confusion. Already the question, "Who am I?"

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is being asked with mounting insistency by millions of Americans; and our society as a whole has been diagnosed, even by friendly observers, as "sick." If theological thought forms can no longer offer a cogent and persuasive plan of salvation, the challenge clearly passes to secular disciplines. Communism is such a discipline, one which we believe to be an evil. Can we devise a truly superior one?

Idolatry in Religion and Science

DAVID BAKAN

"The keynote of idolatry is contentment with the present gods."

A. N. Whitehead.

There exists a view of the relationship between science and religion in which science is envisaged as preempting the role of religion. This view has it that in primitive times man needed answers to questions about his nature, creation, existence, and destiny; and that his need for answers was greater than his need for well-founded beliefs. His urgency made him create myths. These myths are the foundation of religion. In the enlightened present, this view continues, science has produced "better" answers to these questions. The conclusions drawn from science have at times been sharply inconsistent with these religious myths.

Among those who share this view there have arisen a variety of strategies for coping with these inconsistencies. Among them we can find the rejection of religion, the rejection of science, the "rationalization" of religion in the light of scientific enterprise itself, the attempt to draw sharp distinctions between the subject matter of religion and the subject matter of science, etc. I would like to sketch out yet another way of looking at the problem of the relationship between religion and science, using as a fulcrum the very ancient concept of idolatry. Idolatry, it would seem, is a terribly negative concept. I would hope, however, that the positive value of what may appear at first as a negative approach will soon emerge.

Although I am a psychologist it is not as a psychologist that I think of myself in the formulation of these ideas. I am fully aware that in the contemporary world psychology is one of the chief contenders for possession of domains religious, as well as the chief candidate for "Agent to Effect a Reconciliation between Science and Religion." Psychology is a possible point of penetration between these two complexes of thought in that both, presumably, have something to do with the nature of man's mind, heart, or spirit, in one sense or another. I am afraid of psychological apologies for religion. I have more respect for the essential "truth" of religious insight and for the significance of the religious quest than to allow its admission to be dependent upon its coming in upon psychology's coat-tails. Allow me to divest myself of my psychologist's badge if it means that I am a scientific commando attacking religion, or even a

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medical aid man coming to patch up religion's wounds. Nor do I pretend to be a religionist. Although my interests in religion have been intense and long-lasting I would not in any way want to appear as an "expert" in religion. David Riesman commented recently that the only people who were really qualified to be creative and objective about the contemporary world situation are the amateurs, because the "experts" have vested interests in the status quo; and that amateurs might possibly succeed where experts could not. Allow me then to take the posture of an amateur on the matter of the relationship of science and religion — and I sincerely hope that no one will challenge my amateur standing.

Perhaps I am making my point both too slowly and too quickly. By the time that I am done you will realize that I am advocating a kind of amateur standing for all in connection with the problems of the relationships between science and religion. What I wish to say is that a freshness of approach, such as I assume to be associated with amateur standing, is needed for coping with the issues; and that the issues themselves arise out of a certain rigidity and a certain fixity in both religion and in science.

The Impulse of Science and Religion to Appreciate Human Existence

The fundamental impulse of both science and religion is the singular impulse of man to appreciate the nature of his existence in time, in space, in history, and in corporeality, and to appreciate the possibility of transcending any *specific* expression of his nature. All that falls under the heading of either science or religion issues from this singular impulse. The self-definition of man, in substance and in concept, is his most abiding characteristic beyond any specific definition of him; and both the scientific and the religious enterprises are expressions of this self-definitional activity. *This impulse pre-supposes that the manifest is but the barest hint of reality, that beyond the manifest there exist the major portions of reality, and that the function of the impulse is to reach out towards the unmanifest.*

From this singular and most restless impulse in man have come both science and religion; within science many little sciences; within religion many little religions; within science many scientific concepts; and within religion many religious concepts. This splintering of the expression of the impulse is necessary to the expression of the impulse, just as a long poem is the clarification of what is expressible in a single grunt.

The impulse moves *toward* the fulfillment of an objective, but its essence is the motion toward the fulfillment of the objective and not the objective itself. In its impatience to realize the fulfillment of its objective it may seek to satisfy itself more immediately. When man tarries too long, when man seeks to be completely fulfilled on the way towards the objective, when, in effect, he allows

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the impulse to be bribed, then he commits the sin of idolatry, the word which I have used in the title of this paper, and about which I would like to talk.

Allow me to pause for a moment to express some of my misgivings. Sometimes I find myself perseverating over a word in connection with some problem long before I fully know exactly what I am trying to tell myself. From the moment that I began thinking of the nature of the problem posed by this conference several months ago, the word idolatry has been rattling around among my thoughts. In the *Talmud* the question is raised as to the sins one may not commit even on pain of death? And the reply is given that there are three such sins — idolatry, adultery, and murder. Thus, in my thinking, idolatry is a very heinous kind of thing; and its very heinousness should make me pause, so as not to use the term wantonly. But then I remind myself, I am a modern man! The prophets and the *Talmud* notwithstanding, idolatry, in the simple sense of the term, is much too silly a thing in the context of modernity to really worry about. If someone were to put a sword to my ribs to make me bow down before some graven image, I think I would do it readily, for such an act would be trivial for me, as trivial as the exercise of touching my toes without bending my knees. Yet I can not say that the sin of idolatry is impossible for modern man to commit. For whatever was sinful in the idolatry of ancient times is still sinful. What is problematical is to determine exactly what idolatry could possibly mean to modern man. Thus I have misgivings over the use of a term which might possibly be outmoded and insignificant in the context of the modern world. And I have misgivings that if it is a significant thing in the context of modern times is it then not more than I want to take on? I am, as you see, uncertain of my clarity and weak in my conviction.

To return, what I would then say is that idolatry, a term which I will presently attempt to define more relevantly, exists in both our scientific and religious enterprises; that idolatry is associated with their having been split apart as they have; and that idolatries of various kinds tend to maintain sharp inarticulation between them. In what I would consider the proper pursuit of both science and religion the very question which is at the heart of the subject of this conference would not arise.

The Meaning of Idolatry

What is so wrong about the worship of a graven image? Why did Jeremiah and Isaiah carry on so? Were they indeed simply taking the part of the god who was jealous of other gods? Was it simply, as it would seem, a kind of power struggle between gods? Or is there not something about the Judeo-Christian tradition which has some intrinsic features relevant to mankind — something to do with mankind not subjecting himself to abuse? Indeed I ask the question rhetorically. I use the term idolatry as I do because I think that there exists a

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certain — even a certain fundamental — characteristic of the primitive forms of idolatry which has been repeated in both the science and religion of western civilization. And, furthermore, the sickness of the spirit which is supposed to ensue from the practice of primitive idolatry is not too far removed from the sickness of the spirit towards which we address ourselves in the modern world.

As with primitive idolatry neither contemporary science nor contemporary religion are lacking in ardor. *Idolatry is the worship of the means toward the fulfillment of the religious impulse as the fulfillment of the religious impulse.* Put simply, engaging in ritual, painting religious pictures, reading religious literature, etc., are not idolatrous unless they themselves become the *objects* of the worship, rather than the means towards the fulfillment of the religious impulse. Idolatry is the loss of the sense of search, of the sense of freshness of the experience. It is the over-quick fixing upon any method or device or concept as the ultimate fulfillment of the religious impulse. Idolatry is allowing the impulse to be bribed by incomplete but immediate satisfaction. The use of religious objects as reminders, as sensory provocation, etc., of the religious impulse is not idolatrous. What is idolatrous is the frame of mind that allows them to be ultimate.

What I am saying is of course not novel to the Judeo-Christian tradition and especially not to the ethical part of this tradition. Running throughout the Judaeo-Christian tradition is the message that one should not settle for easy and immediate satisfaction of the impulse life, that the satisfaction of an impulse should be appropriate to the impulse, and that the religious impulse should have its satisfaction in God. The worship of one's self, the sin of pride, is idolatrous in that it is an impulse which should be directed towards God. The sexual impulse should not be spent except upon the proper object. The aggressive impulse should be spent only upon him who is truly an enemy. Jeremiah, the fearful warner against back-sliding, helps us to understand the significance of idolatry. Idolatry, he says, makes the people "provoke themselves to the confusion of their own faces" (Jeremiah 7:19). We could grow sophisticated and talk about the way in which the pluralism, and the tendency to fix upon each item in the contemporary plural, have produced a problem in identity, but Jeremiah's "provoke themselves to the confusion of their own faces" catches at the problem effectively.

I yield to the temptation of identifying idolatry as I have defined it with the picture of contemporary neurosis. I believe that there is probably a relationship between psychological difficulty and sin as has been suggested by Professor Mowrer, if not exactly in the sense that he has suggested. The thing about the sin of idolatry, at least in the way in which I understand it, is that it is so costly to the person. I am not sure that I can specify exactly the nature of psychological cost for one or another enterprise that the human being engages in, but there is little question that the psychological cost is great. It is a most expensive kind of

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indulgence. The neurosis is a kind of fixity or rigidity at a certain stage of development. It is to become arrested at a way station and usually for the small satisfaction that is to be had at the stage. In the neurosis the individual continues to struggle to win a kind of satisfaction from the old when in fact he should be working towards the future for its greater gratification with a freshness. As Fenichel puts it, the essential feature of neurotic behavior is that "patients, instead of reacting vividly to actual stimuli, according to their specific nature, react repeatedly with rigid patterns."¹ It is the persistence in an earlier stage of development that constitutes the neurosis. My definition of idolatry conceives of it as a kind of "being stuck" in the pursuit of the fulfillment of the basic religious impulse. The neurosis too is a matter of being stuck at a particular way of fulfilling the impulses of the person.

I have made these comments on the neurosis not because I would at the moment be ready to pursue the thesis that idolatry is neurosis, but only to somewhat concretize what it is that I am saying about the relationships between science and religion. What I would say is that the neurosis and idolatry are something like each other.

But to return. Consider for the moment this God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, this God who asserted his identity and forbade idolatry. I am no theologian and would not want to enter into any pursuit of the nature of God. But as a religious conception I would regard this as an act of religious genius (and I submit that I have difficulty in fully understanding the distinction between conception and revelation). This God was a God made single, invisible, ubiquitous, and I think, most importantly, a God with whom contact was always a bit dubious. The very dubiousness of grace in the thought of Calvin is, I think, one of the great features of his thought. This was indeed a concept of God which could serve the religious impulse of mankind in a way which would not do violence to his nature. Never could mankind have the sense of closure in contact with this God and yet the contact with this God was always in the realm of possibility, even if it be unknown whether at any time, or for any individual, such contact could be. This is the paradoxical feature of this God, that of *possible yet dubious contact*, contact always possibly available, and yet in doubt — a God, and I think that this is critical, knowable in the limited region of the expression of his nature (i.e. a piece of the world, a concretization in parts of man, etc.) but not ultimately knowable. This was a God to be continuously worked towards, a God who was as continuous, as frustrating and as fulfilling as life itself. The commandment against idolatry was a commandment to believe that complete substantial contact with God could never have taken place. The substantial contact with God must always be in the nature of a search. One must always be filled with a sense

¹Fenichel, O., *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1945, p. 542.

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of wonder of that which was not yet contacted. One must always be yearning towards fulfillment, but fulfillment must be maintained as an ideal. Fulfillment was always away, and seeming fulfillment always mythical, at least, and more than likely, idolatrous. The genius of the concept of God so developed inheres in the very fact that a certain lack of completion was always involved. For in this lack of completion is contained the means whereby man can maintain the freshness of experience which experience demands.

Let me say what I want to say in another way. The God of Western Man is conceived of as playing a grand and cosmic game of peek-a-boo with mankind. Perhaps only in this game of peek-a-boo is God relevant to man. He insists that he shall play peek-a-boo with man. Freud once pointed out that the satisfaction of games like peek-a-boo for a child consists in learning to control an environment of which he feels fearful, and with respect to which he wishes to achieve some mastery. Through the playing of peek-a-boo a child trains himself for the time when his parents do leave him. In the game it is a playful leaving, and by virtue of its play character, it is less threatening. So perhaps it is with mankind at large. Mankind has developed a concept of God with whom he forever plays peek-a-boo, and through it manages to learn how to manage his life! When the day comes that he clings to an image of the ever-present God as the real one, and therefore, in effect, stops the game of peek-a-boo with God, then he loses out on the fundamental value of the game.

The history of the Judeo-Christian religion is filled with instances in which a means of fulfilling the religious impulse became the object of worship itself; and the history is also filled with instances in which people became discontented with such idolatrous tendencies and reaffirmed the fundamental religious quest with the rejection of the idolatrous objects, substituting a renewed search for the seeming satisfaction.

Where Science Joins Religion

But let us now consider science. The scientific impulse and the religious impulse are not nearly as separate as some modern thought might lead one to believe. To point to the religiosity of people like Newton, Kepler, Fechner, and others cannot be taken as *a priori* evidence for the view that the impulses are the same. But the dynamics of the relationship become a bit clearer in a figure like that of Jonathan Edwards, the Puritan minister. To study the nature of God was his obligation. The God whom he had in his thoughts was a God of a self-distancing nature, who predestined the universe. How did this predestination of God work itself out? For Jonathan Edwards, Newton almost literally opened up the sky for him. God had predestined the world by fashioning the world-machine

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as Newton had conceived it. He had given it a shove and had made the law of inertia, and then the universe carried on and would thus carry on unto eternity. To study the physics of Newton was then to study the nature of God. In Edwards' thought God's omnipresence is translated into the equation of God and space. How shall I put it? In the mind of a man like Edwards the acceptance of Newtonian mechanics, later to become the chief competitor of the religious outlook, is the answer to the problem of how to know God. It is the *means* for the knowledge of God.

The mechanical conception of the nature of the universe has for several centuries been one of the major pawns in the struggle between religion and science. It has sometimes been offered as a major contender for a concept of the nature of the universe to replace that which presumably is held by the exponents of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the minds of many intellectuals who have grown up in the last century the question for them has seemed to be that of making a *choice* between the one and the other because of seeming incompatibility between them.

It is my opinion, and the burden of this paper, that the *degree of strain between religion and science is the direct function of the degree of idolatry, as I have defined it, in both religion and science.*

The Bible is indeed one of the finest expressions and means of fulfillment of the religious impulse. Yet to make it the *end* of worship and devotion is idolatrous. It is only when the Bible is idolatrously worshipped that it can be seriously threatened by either the Darwinian theory of evolution, the discovery of the Law of Moses in Hamurabi, or the "higher criticism" of the Bible which gives it a later date than is commonly believed and an origin less than that of divine revelation in the simple sense.

Similarly the mechanical conception of the nature of the universe was a magnificent intellectual achievement in the way of coming to an understanding of the operation of the heavenly bodies and matter in motion on the earth itself. Yet especially in the 19th century the mechanical conception of the nature of the universe became the object of idolatrous worship. It became in time not something to consider or even to believe in, but an item of *faith* such that the challenge of it was considered unscientific (a word which was used almost synonymously with blasphemous). In some scientific circles, to challenge the proposition that the universe was exhaustively explainable in terms of matter and motion could only be labelled as "heretical." Yet I would maintain that this worship of the mechanical conception was as idolatrous as any religious activity could be.

Insofar as the scientific enterprise is concerned the disease of idolatry has been dubbed the disease of methodolatry, the worship of method. In terms of our conception of idolatry it is certainly the case that certain ways have been of value and will continue to be of value in exploring the nature of man and the world

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and their relationships. However, when there is a worship of these methods themselves rather than the objective toward which they are directed, then indeed does science become idolatrous.

Conclusion

As I have indicated, in both science and religion there is the assumption that the fundamental reality is that which is beyond the manifest. And no matter how far our explorations go, and no matter how much we manage to uncover, there is always the huge world of the unmanifest. If at any stage of development we begin to worship the manifest or the means whereby we have made some part manifest, then indeed can it be said that we are being idolatrous.

If it were possible to root our idolatrous tendencies in both science and religion, then the singularity of the impulse expressed in both science and religion would emerge with clarity. It is not that religion, as some have maintained, supplies mythical answers until science can provide more valid ones. Rather it is that both religion and science are attempts on the part of mankind to search out the nature of himself and the world in which he lives. But it is *search* rather than answer which is significant. Indeed, as soon as either the scientist or the theologian allows himself to be fixed upon an answer as though it were the ultimate fulfillment of his impulse, then indeed does he stop being either scientist or theologian and becomes an idolater.

Science and Religious Faith in Mutual Support

JAMES HOUSTON SHRADER

For many years now we have been hearing about the conflict between religion and science. Actually this conflict has existed ever since ancient man called on both the magician and the priest for help in meeting his needs. Man has learned that he can succeed better by the use of science than of magic or of religion in making the world behave as he wishes.

Science has earned this high place in man's respect. Those nations that have utilized science as the basis of their living have progressed to dominance in world affairs and to increased control of the forces of nature, all this through increased understanding of nature. Science starts with secular experience. It conquers distance, climate, night, disease, and has made inroads on the demands of death. All these accomplishments lie in the realm of man's physical needs.

Man's Needs

Fundamentally, man's basic urge is to survive, to keep alive. This expresses itself in the immediate, direct, and instant hunger of the body for food and water. These needs come first of all man's desires. These are the most basic because if not met, man dies — and then there is no further problem for him.

But when these desires are met, even during their gratification, others begin to assert themselves. Among these are the requirements for shelter, for clothing, for sleep, and so on. All these have been called animal needs.

When these have been more or less satisfied man seeks safety and security, as close to the level of his basic urge to survive. Rising above this need appears the feeling for belongingness. Man craves to love and be loved. The importance of this is recognized in the fact that medical authorities and social workers have found that when infants are deprived of affection they fail to develop normally and often wither away and die. It is a "must" in psychotherapy.

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Having all these man is not satisfied. He seeks approval and commendation from himself and from society. A related one beckons him on to self-realization, as the psychologists call it. This bespeaks the urge "to make something of ourselves." Man wants to excel in some sport or to win in games, in other words, to triumph in competitive struggle. All this bespeaks his urge to express himself.

Beyond these lies another need, namely, the basic urge to understand and to know the reason for the existence and behavior of things all about us. The thirst for knowledge, the sense for the aesthetic, the social urge to share, all these are experiences universal to mankind. They have existed in man since primordial times. The Greeks valued all this in the ideas of truth, beauty, and goodness.

While man was learning to keep alive and to control his environment to a degree, he began to inquire into the nature of his surroundings. He trembled at the noise of thunder; he was impressed with the occurrence of disease and death as mysteries; he marveled at earthquakes, lunar and solar eclipses, floods, tornadoes. He was attracted by the sublimity and grandeur of nature. Even paleolithic man's burial remains attest this concern — way back there. Throughout the whole history of the human race man has struggled to keep alive, to associate and to communicate with his fellows, and to seek encounter with the forces or powers that he intuitively felt gave meaning to his being and existence. These latter interests lie in that area of man's psyche or mind that is called the "spirit." From this platform, so to speak, man reaches "up" to what he feels is the transcendent reality.

This upreach of spirit expresses the religious motif. It is the oldest, the most widely prevalent, the most stable, the most inspirationally creative, the most culturally expressive of *homo sapiens*. Every art of civilization had its beginnings in religion.¹ It is the oldest of man's institutions and its followers number more than those of any non-religious culture-group.

Hierarchy of Needs

There seems to be a regular hierarchy of needs, a sort of graded sequence.² When the "lower" or animal needs are met the "higher" ones begin to assert themselves. This advance, so to speak, is indicated by the decreasing emphasis on animal needs and an increasing emphasis on the purely abstract ones as man

¹Kroeber, A. L., *Configurations of Culture Growth*. University of California Press, Berkeley, Cal., 1944, 882 pages. pp. 803-804; 844.

Sorokin, Pitirim A., *Society, Culture, and Personality*. Harper & Bros., New York, 1947. 742 pages. p. 225.


²Maslow, Abraham H., *Motivation and Personality*. Harper & Bros., New York, 1954. 411 pages. p. 97; chap. 5.

Montagu, M. F. Ashley, *The Direction of Human Development*. Harper & Bros. New York, 1955, 404 pages. pp. 150 f.

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develops his culture and experience. The former may be grouped roughly about the physical requirements of the body, the latter, in the area of the spirit (the latest and most highly developed characteristic of mind) for "controlled expression" in language and art, in theory, myth, and religion.³ The further development of this area constitutes man's expression of "soul,"⁴ the highest level of goal-seeking. Such a differentiation between body and spirit is not considered to be real in any basic sense: both are highly integrated parts of one living organism.

Wholeness. The analogy between the hierarchical sequence of man's needs and a continuous light spectrum is illustrated in Diagram I. At the red end I have placed the basic animal needs for food and water. Then sequentially I have



* These subjects were not included in my perceptual base

DIAGRAM I

³Portmann, Adolph, "Biology and the Phenomenon of the Spirit," in *Spirit and Nature*. Pantheon Books, New York, 1954, 492 pages. pp. 367-368.

⁴Sinnott, Emund W., *The Biology of the Spirit*. The Viking Press, New York, 1955, 180 pages. pp. 155-160.

———, *Matter, Mind, and Man: The Biology of Human Nature*. Harper & Bros., New York, 1957, 225 pages. p. 112.

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placed the rising levels of needs, until way over at the violet end of the spectrum I have placed the highest psychological needs, namely, those of the realization of the virtues of goodness, truth, and beauty. In the ultra-violet, beyond the sensory area, I have placed religious expression as transcendent of the physical and sensory. These areas of needs all merge into one another imperceptibly with no lines of demarcation between them.

These spiritual areas have needs that are just as demanding as are those of the other areas of man's being, as for example, his need for vitamins. These spiritual needs express man's aspirations for fulfilling himself in areas beyond those of only physical well-being; they express his total experience.

Values. The means for gratifying our needs are the grounds for our values. We prize that which we want and so we pay to get it. As gratification urges become satiated our cultural growth creates new needs which we strive for. The requirements of the organism are the biological ground for its basic values. All living human beings have them. We see them in a modified degree in the order of animals below that of man. These traits are built into the nature of things. They all indicate the way "the winds of the universe are blowing," as Dewey expressed it. These basic needs are fundamental for the health of the organism. Since our purposive endeavor is to live, then gratification of these needs cannot be wrong. (Of course, when abused, they may destroy us, as for example, when too much water drowns us.) The test of value is organismic health in a coherent setting that harmonizes with the best that we know. They indicate the direction that nature indicates for the person to travel. In this manner the virtues of love, altruism, goodwill, beneficence, sociality, and cooperation can be traced back in an unbroken line through the brotherhood of man, the gregariousness of animals, and the associative (reactivity) of inorganic entities, all expressing the same basic urge at their respective levels of consciousness and/or reactive sensitivity. The study of all such phenomena is the subject matter and objectives of the discipline of science.

Science and Methodology

"Science" as I use the word here expresses the point of view that insists on a rational explanation of the experience of apprehending phenomena by experiments and observations, leading to the formulation of explanatory theories that can be publicly validated. Its emphasis is facts and their public verification of overall hypotheses, theories, and doctrines.

The word "religion" in this paper means a group-shared system of thought and action which orients the person in his ultimate concern physically, socially, and spiritually to Cosmic Reality,⁵ the philosophic name for "God." It is com-

⁵Shrader, James H., "What is Religion?" *Religious Inquiry*, No. 20, April 1958, pp. 1-4.

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prised within the currently popular phrase "ultimate concern" but gives a sharper focus to one particular facet, so to speak, of man's interest.

Knowledge is grounded on man's personal experience. By his senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, he established vital contact with the world about him. By their use he was able to keep alive, and then to grow and develop as above outlined. Common-sense knowledge is what the man-in-the-street understands to be the nature of things. This enables him to distinguish dreams from reality. He does this by ascertaining whether the situation "makes sense." His court of last resort is the experience that he gets from his senses and his feelings in their correspondence with what he observes to be "out there." This common-sense outlook gives him a kind of practical know-how that usually gets him by, so to speak. However, he found that this procedure was not always completely dependable. For example, the earth seems to be flat and the sun to revolve around it, but now he knows differently, in fact, just the opposite. The kind of experience that leads to such conclusions as the latter is the procedure of science.

Methodology of Science. In brief, the method of science comprises three main steps: First, the scientist gathers all the relevant facts that he can as apparently related to the question before him. Second, he devises a theory that seems to him to be a plausible explanation of these facts. This idea is at first called an hypothesis. It is always a guess, albeit an enlightened guess, that he believes will best describe all similar events. It might just as well be called a belief or a doctrine. All these words mean about the same thing with only relatively slightly different connotations. Third, if predictions from the hypothesis work out to give results as postulated, he considers that the hypothesis may be correct.

But such compliance does not mean that the theory is absolutely true. Maybe some other one might likewise fit the phenomena. Such has happened many times in the history of science. In fact, science can never absolutely *prove* irrevocably anything to be true. There is always the possibility that later knowledge may give a better basis for another answer. A recent example is Einstein's relativity theory that supersedes Newton's theory of gravitation.

When an hypothesis has been verified several times, it assumes the "higher" level of being a theory, and when this is well substantiated over a long time, it is called a law.

Operationally, this procedure as followed in the instant paper, is illustrated in Diagram II, as based on the epistemology of Margenau.⁶ The heavy vertical line represents the plane of nature, and all the objects of sense and phenomena of

⁶Margenau, Henry, *The Nature of Physical Reality*. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1950, 479 pages. chap. 4, 5, 6.

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experience lie in this area of perception. Each such "given" event is called a "percept" in this nomenclature. These are the beginnings and the termini of cognition.

Experience moves from these sensory, spontaneous, given data to rational reflection which seeks to relate them to wholes or inter-connected patterns of knowledge and insight into the structure and functioning of nature. Each such hypothesis is called a "construct."

The guiding relations between percepts and constructs, the leap from fact to hypothesis, are called "rules of correspondence." These are in fact metaphysical principles, correlating explanations with immediate experience. In the diagram, those rules of correspondence which connect percepts with constructs are represented by double lines; those that connect constructs with one another are called formal ones and are single lines. In other words, a formal connection sets a construct in a purely logical relation with another construct; an epistemic (double line) connection links the construct with data (facts of experience).

By this procedure we move in an orderly manner from the multifarious events of everyday life — a great haze of all kinds of experiences — to an insight into nature which shows it to be an orderly, consistent, harmonious pattern that is so reliable, so to speak, and cognizable that man can predict what nature will do under certain circumstances that he himself can impose. In other words, he can invent a science that enables him to control certain aspects of nature because he understands nature.

This procedure is illustrated in Diagram II.


Constructs are explanations that purport to relate diverse phenomena into a coherent whole. They remain as speculations unless and until they are verified in experience as being true. If A, then B. Verification involves behavior by the observer AS IF the construct (A) were true (B). So he plans experiments (experiences), assembles equipment, and then proceeds to create conditions whereby the idea can be observed in its application as predictable events. He exercises *faith* that the test will reveal the correctness of the construct. Verification involves the step of personal commitment.

Starting with any material (element) like iron or gold, we subdivide it until we have the smallest part that our art can apply; there still remains a sizeable particle. We *believe* that this can be subdivided into an atom — too small to be seen as such but postulated to be an entity. This is the *atomic theory*. On this hypothesis we arrange the atoms in a conceptual scheme called the Periodic Table; this advances our knowledge by reason of the insight it gives of the relations between the elements and therefore a broader perspective from which to advance our knowledge. This leads to a further hypothesis as to the structure of the atom. Starting with the percept of a piece of copper (step # 1), we postulate the hypothesis of the atom (step # 2). From this hypothesis (a construct),

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we postulate further that all atoms have a definite relation to all other atoms (step # 3), and then by step # 4, we postulate the structure. All this was inductive reasoning.

Now, if the hypothesis of the structure is correct, then we can deduce that the atom can be broken down into electrical (charged) particles (step # 5): radioactivity (atom-smashing by neutron bombardment), which is publicly known by



All entities (hypotheses, laws, doctrines, postulates) are purely ideas only but are testable

All phenomena (events) over here are publicly experienced

DIAGRAM II

anybody who is interested to look for it. We started with experienced facts, set up hypotheses to explain these facts, and then validated the hypotheses by deductively arriving back again at a different set of facts. The sequence is facts to hypotheses (constructs) and then back to facts.

The very nature of science is the motivation to explore, to adventure into the unknown, to probe unceasingly for wider and deeper insights into the workings and the nature of the universe. Science is the one great discipline that is continually seeking to find its errors. Therefore, it is dynamically self-correcting. It is not afraid to criticize itself. This practice does not discredit science. It enhances public acceptance. For example, no one thinks less of science because biochemists found that the calorific requirements for an adequate diet must be supplemented by taking vitamins. This dynamic keeps science on the march: it does not grow stale through stagnancy.

Application of Scientific Methodology to Religion

In just the same way that the scientist starts with data from the phenomena that he experiences all around him and then builds hypotheses on them to explain their behavior, so I have done in seeking to understand what religion "is all about." Since we cannot deal adequately with only an isolated area of man but must consider him as a whole — body, mind, spirit, and soul, as commonly held — I have surveyed wide and varied fields of man's behavior and interests that are embraced in the disciplines of physical science, biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, historiography, aesthetics, mysticism, and religion. These supply public information as expressive of man's reactions to these multifarious fields of experience. By his behavior and expressions, we interpret his characteristics — similarly to the way that we determine the structure of matter and its properties by observing how it behaves under various stimuli (reagents or reactors). On the other hand, the reaction of a known body (the reactant) to its reactors gives some idea of the corresponding nature or properties of the reactors themselves. Their interaction works in both directions — each reveals what the other is like.

Applying this method to the subject of religion, I abstracted out of all available, observable phenomena that which is sensory and also that which is expressively-subjective (publicly known). This gave me a list of phenomena in each of the fields investigated. They constituted "percepts" in the P-plane of nature. Keeping within the conventional areas of each discipline, I postulated (by hypotheses) that these data are explainable as parts of a larger patterned structure. These parts are constructs, all linked by rules of correspondence into a network of supporting ideas. As we progress to the left with ever broader conceptualizations we regress finally to the extreme left, to Reality. This I have designated by the symbol "X."

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In Diagram III (p. 241) I have collected some of the data from all nine realms studied. It illustrates how we can proceed inductively from public knowledge of religious phenomena (that exists to some extent in every field of human activity) to beliefs (doctrines) that are supported at the start on verifiable evidence, publicly observed (facts of experience). Then by deduction I set up testable theorems to ascertain whether or not the construct (doctrine) is valid. For example, starting from the percept of organisms I set up the construct (hypothesis) of life. From the construct of life I set up another "higher" construct of mind. On this I set up a broader one yet, called spirit, and thence on to "X."

Consonant with the scientific methodology I then test the truth of this construct by operational theorems. For example, since I postulate that "X" (as Cosmic Reality or "God") possesses the characteristics of personality, then the use of appropriate practices (analogously to the use of formulae and instruments in physical science) should be expected to entail a type of response such as that between two persons, namely, spiritual and other psychic rapport. Failure to experience such a response does not discredit the idea any more than the attempt to utilize radio signals without a receiving set negates the idea of radio waves. In religion the "receiving set" is a person who has committed himself to God in ultimate concern, thereby providing the sensitive psychic conditions necessary for receipt of spiritual power.

The simplest idea that would explain all the observed phenomena that living human beings encounter is to postulate the being of a conscious cosmic reality. This instant approach is unique on two counts: it utilizes current scientific methodology and it is based on a wider spectrum, so to speak, of human artifacts than any other base with which I am acquainted. I give as much importance to man's consciousness, for example, as to inorganic nature and cosmic organization. Much subjective experience is publicly known: everybody knows what is meant by someone when he says that he has a toothache. We all know when a person is in love. Education certainly is subjective, and yet we can test it, even quantitatively. The whole art of medical practice is based on the interpretation of subjective states. Here also lie the fields of jurisprudence, political science, social relations, and much of psychology and mysticism.

Again referring to "X" as having all the characteristics of the highest development of man (and presumably much more besides), we can best visualize it as a transcendent living person (at least) with aspects that are best described practically as "Heavenly Father," not in any explicitly anthropomorphic sense but as a symbol to facilitate spiritually-motivated disciplines, i.e., religious practices. Communication (conscious intercourse) between such a Being and man could not occur if there were no areas of similarity. Analogously, that is why oil and water do not mix — there is not enough nor the right kind of contact.

Here is no merely cold, distant, First Cause, nor a "Divine Engineer" as such,

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nor an impersonal Pure Being. It is a conception of a Cosmic Spring from which streams influences ("forces") that man can visualize best as the idea of a benign father, again, as "Our Heavenly Father." It means that whatever God may be in the totality of his Being He at least possesses all the traits that a living human being has, and personality is one. They must be alike to a degree in order to communicate.

The Christian Religion

The foregoing is the way that the Christian religion started. When John the Baptist was in prison he sent his disciples to inquire of Jesus as to whether he was the one, after all, for whom the Jews had all been looking. Jesus did not say straight out that of course he was the one, as John himself had previously asserted. Jesus said something entirely different, and highly significant. He said, "Go and tell him what John hear and see: the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them" (Mt. 11:4,5). In other words, he told John to look around and ponder on what all this meant. Inference was held by Jesus to be more convincing than authoritative assertion.

In like vein, the Apostle John in the first epistle recounts "That which . . . we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and touched" (I John 1:1).

These events and others emphasize the importance of living experiences to validate religious truth. In fact, it was upon such down-to-earth facts that Jesus exhorted his followers to accept his teachings. He taught that "through their fruits ye shall know them." The Christian religion originally was a fact-based, doctrinal system whereby God the Father was seen only through Jesus, as St. John affirms. The evidence for belief in God was indirect. This makes it a construct. Belief in God is a doctrine (hypothesis) that man subscribes to as he encounters the record of the life and spiritual insights of Jesus. First came the observed facts of Jesus' life and ministry, and then came the doctrinal statements later. The writer of the Book of Hebrews asserts: "For whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him" (Heb. 11:6). Again the sequence: facts from Jesus' ministry, belief in God as based on these facts, and then expectancy of answered prayer, all summed up as facts, doctrine, facts (experience).

Here we see the formula of the methodology of science: first the observed facts, then on them the formulated hypotheses (doctrines) that make these phenomena or events meaningful, and finally their validation through verification of prediction (rewards). The two disciplines follow a similar procedure.

Service of Science to Religion. Science serves the religious realm in a




DIAGRAM III

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number of ways. In the first place, science makes increasingly possible our power to overcome the inertia of nature and to utilize it more and more so that we are enabled to devote time and effort to meeting our needs in the higher realms of consciousness as described above, e.g., the design of laborsaving devices of many kinds to release man from needless toil and to make possible such religious campaigns as the current Billy Graham crusades, peace marches for the abandonment of war, programs for the upbuilding of the under-privileged nations, and the meeting of the needs of man in health, food, and shelter.

In the second place, science provides a mass of validated information for the construction of a cosmology that helps us to understand man and his responsibility to comply with nature's laws of health, and with interplanetary societal responsibilities.

Furthermore, it furnishes a dependable methodology for arriving at an hypothesis or conceptualization of religion that harmonizes with all other experience, thus making religion the most natural thing in the world. No longer would it have to rely on a man-made, complicated structure or system of doctrines (often contradictory) but would provide a basis for a simple, Jesus-like approach to God that uses a methodology that has world-wide acceptance.

It does something more. Its methodology for erecting constructs on a basis of facts gives us an interlocking structure of concepts (doctrines) that are so mutually supporting that when, as, and if any one or even several should later be found to be incorrect, this new information does not invalidate nor even shake the strength and dependability of the whole structure. Its doctrinal structure would constitute a vast network of inter-related hypotheses (beliefs) which are connected by cross-references to other constructs in the system, analogous to struts on a bridge. This is illustrated in Diagram III. Here it is seen that the removal of any of several constructs (and even some percepts) does not entail the collapse of the structure.

Finally, religion so conceived is more strongly based and convincing than when it rests entirely on authoritarian pronouncements of alleged private revelation, say, to Joseph Smith or to Mohammed or to other mystics. It makes religion intelligible to anyone who is disinclined to base his religious belief on the bare assertions of "authorities," especially when these have vested interests, professional positions to maintain, or ecclesiastical status to defend. Here is a basis that can be used to appeal to anyone who respects science but not religion, as for example, skeptical intelligentsia, agnostics, irreligionists, or communists.

Service of Religion to Science. In the sixth century B.C., Pythagoras linked science and religion in a mystical interpretation of a rational order in the universe. Geometry arose by the priests of Egypt for measuring the land that had been inundated by the Nile. Astronomy arose in Babylon to set the times for sacred festivals. In England for centuries medicine and nursing were the work of monks

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and nuns; St. Bartholomew is the oldest hospital. Practically all of England's older schools, as well as the greater part of Oxford and Cambridge, are religious foundations.

Starting from the fountainhead of Christian theology as molded by Greek philosophy men's minds became trained to recognize a cosmic sense of order — the conception of the personal energy of Jehovah and the rationality of a Greek philosopher. The scholastics became gropingly aware of the organization of the universe, something not evident to unreflective men. This religious classicism developed the techniques of philosophical discourse. This made science possible. Without philosophy, the moral sense, and a strong ethical idealism, there would never have been — nor could there exist today — any science. Science in its spectacular modern form arose in a Christian setting. As Whitehead expressed it, this long training inculcated in man's minds the idea that there is a secret order of things that can be unveiled: the rationality of God. The clearest common expression of this feeling is *natural law*.⁷

Experimental science emerged as an effective new intellectual discipline by the fostering of the Reformation.⁸ The rediscovery of the Jewish attitude toward nature as being good was direct protest against the Greek contempt for the natural world. The Greek preference for metaphysics had been further developed by Christian theology. The new emphasis on Jewish elements in Christian tradition brought an increased interest in nature, without which experimental science was impossible.

It was the rise of the great universities out of the cathedral system in Europe that conserved the learning of the ancients, or fostered the streams that came into Europe from Moorish and Eastern sources. In these centers of learning, the discipline of science emerged out of philosophical rationalization. Science in its spectacular modern form arose in a Christian setting, was organized by Christian men of science (such as Galileo, Newton, and earlier Roger Bacon), and was promoted in Christian institutions of learning. Einstein is quoted as stating: "Certain it is that a conviction akin to religious feeling, of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a high order."⁹

Wherever Christianity has penetrated the cause of education has flourished. These are the great centers where science has been encouraged to open up new avenues of knowledge which the world at large recognizes in technology. This is now the basis of our whole industrial plant, thereby creating a new area. Science and technology have captured the world's imagination and have provided an

⁷Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World*. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1925, chap. I.

⁸Nash, Arnold S., *The University and the Modern World*. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1943, 312 pages. chap. II.

⁹Reiser, Oliver L., *The Integration of Human Knowledge*. Peter Sargent, Boston, 1958, 478 pages. p. 311.

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intellectual discipline that has won the world's respect and general acceptance.

The rise of science has introduced and fostered a universally sharpened moral sense. Without the strong ethical idealism of intellectual honesty, conscientious devotion to acknowledging credit for the work of others, tolerance for the opinions of others, freedom of thought and speech for oneself and for others, personal honor, independence of thinking, originality and creativity in the pursuit of truth regardless of and independent of personal advantage or disadvantage taking priority over all other demands,¹¹ science today would not be possible.

Conclusion

In summary, we see that science serves religion: (1) by facilitating man's control over nature in order to be free to pursue the quest for the higher values; (2) by providing a dependable methodology for conceptualizing religious truth that is harmonious with all of nature in one great cosmological whole; (3) by giving an inter-locking network of mutually supporting doctrines; and (4) by furnishing a methodology that has received worldwide acceptance.

On the other hand, religion serves science: (1) by fostering science, particularly astronomy, medicine, and mathematics in connection with religious festivals and social service; (2) by training man's thinking into channels of rationality and philosophical rigor; (3) by breaking the power of Greek ideas of contempt for nature and restoring interest in the study of nature; (4) by developing the great universities and centers of learning around the cathedrals, thereby preserving the ancient insights and fostering exploration into the new; (5) by introducing education at high and low levels wherever organized Christianity has penetrated; and (6) by fostering a high moral sense and ethical practice that is universally recognized.

The methodology of both disciplines follows, or may follow, similar patterns of sequential facts, constructs, and then fact again — "check and double-check." In ordinary language we call these the data of experience, the explanations of these data, and the prediction of new data by seeking to apply previous experience. Religious thinking as well as scientific both collaboratively rise from earth-bound dimensions to cosmic ones, as Tennyson has so well expressed:

"One God, one law, one element
and one far-off event
To which the whole creation moves."

¹¹Bronowski, J., *Science and Human Values*. Julian Messner, Inc., New York, 1956, 94 pages. pp. 77 f.

The Church-College Dialogue: What is it About?

JOHN KNOX COIT

Toward the close of the ninth book of the *Republic*, after the pursuit of justice had led Socrates to project the outlines of an ideal state, Glaucon expresses scepticism as to whether such a city in fact exists anywhere on earth or ever will exist. Socrates agrees, but adds, "In heaven . . . there is laid up a pattern of [this city] which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order" (Bk. IX, 592).

Now I do not believe that there is any Platonic archetype of the church-related college "laid up in heaven." If there were, surely some of our more cultivated minds would have by this time grasped it and be further along than they are toward its realization. One of the study commissions of the Second Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges, which met at Drake University in 1958, had as its project, "The Theological Foundations of the Christian College." Because of "a limitation of time" the commission did not elaborate the theological tenets from which the existence of the Christian college logically follows, but it did refer to the "pragmatic and functional reasons for the establishment of colleges by the Church in the United States."¹ Though the commission suggested that the theological foundations "be one of the subjects for consideration at the third convocation in 1962," it may be just as well to leave justification for the existence of the Christian college at the "pragmatic and functional" level. This is certainly not to suggest that there is no relationship between theology and the Christian college, but it is to say that the church-related college is uniquely an American phenomenon which arose in response to certain particular needs of frontier America and that with the passing of the frontier the question has become whether there are particular needs in our day which only the church-related college can meet. If so, the church-related college can be justified whether or not its existence follows directly from some theological conviction. I think there is, from a Christian point of view, a definite need for the Christian college in our day. This should become apparent in what follows.

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¹*The Christian Scholar*, Vol. XLI (Autumn, 1958), pp. 275-276.

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What is the Current Consensus?

The debate about the nature of church-sponsored higher education is, of course, part of the current controversy over the character and function of education-at-large in our society and this, doubtless, is a reflection of the general cultural crisis of our times. Incisive criticisms have been made of our public schools and of our colleges and universities, secular and Christian. Changes have taken place. Numerous reconstructions of curricula on the higher levels of education have been made and tried out with varying degrees of success. Whatever degree of consensus may be emerging about what our public schools and secular colleges ought to be doing, it seems that there has appeared a rather wide agreement among Christian educators about the nature of the church-sponsored college. I do not mean that this consensus prevails among all trustees and administrators of our church colleges, or among faculty or rank-and-file church members. I mean to include here many of those who have written over the past ten years on the subject, members of denominational and inter-denominational boards of education, and numbers of college deans and presidents.³

In what does this consensus consist? Negatively, there seems to be general agreement that the church college is not justified by the advanced piety of its faculty, by any protective influence exercised over its students, by the inclusion of required Bible courses and chapel attendance, or the sponsorship of a faith and life week. The church college is not Eden restored, nor is it the home or the church. Further, as conditions are today in America, the quality of secular higher education is not so low that the church must maintain colleges in order to maintain standards. In fact, many persons fear that not a few church colleges have lower academic standards than comparable secular institutions.

Agreement on the foregoing points is so widespread among professional church educators that the fact that many of the rank and file of church members dissent from these views may be obscured. It has been my experience that most of the students in the church-related college in which I teach believe that the differentiae of the church college lie somewhere in the area of piety, Bible study and chapel attendance. The alarming aspect of this is that most of them still think so when they graduate! And since they cannot see that their piety has been materially advanced, or that their required Bible courses relate very directly to anything else in the curriculum, they go away sceptics about the church college (or about their own particular one) though many of them are appreciative of the

³It seems, for example, that the consensus of which I speak is fairly widespread among those who addressed the First and Second Quadrennial Convocations of Christian Colleges in 1954 and 1958. Widespread consensus is not unanimity, to be sure.

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excellence of instruction they have received in one or another of the traditional academic fields.

Positively, it would seem that there is considerable consensus among church educators on at least the following points:

1. The importance of liberal education, especially in a society dominated by technology and specialization.
2. The responsibility of the Christian for society in any age and all the more in our present cultural crisis.
3. That Christians have no corner on the power of God or his truth.
4. That a Protestant scholasticism is undesirable but that the elaboration of our contemporary understanding of the Christian doctrines of creation, fall, and redemption, is of central importance.³
5. That it is the function of the Christian college to make clear to those whom it teaches the relationship between Christian faith and all phases of life.
6. That some method should be devised whereby the church-related college may carry on critical and constructive conversation with those segments of society and especially those educational agencies which do not regard themselves as Christian.

I would suggest very simply that while the task of making clear to our youth the nature of Christian faith and its relation to the world might conceivably be performed by agencies other than the church college, it is today quite obviously not going to be done without the help of the church college. The Christian college is, therefore, justified in our day on a "pragmatic and functional" basis.

The Plea for Realism

Now verbal consensus is no guarantee of real agreement in theory or practice. This is why conversation must go on all the time aimed at formulation and clarification of our Christian theology and educational philosophy. But let us be realistic in our aims. We can try to do too much and end up by doing too little. Dr. Outler, recognizing the importance of having a total framework within which to fit our thinking about ourselves and our world, but observing that the world views of medieval Christendom, of classical Protestantism, and of the Enlightenment, have each passed away, appeals for the development of a contemporary Christian view. In his address before the First Quadrennial Convocation of Christian Colleges, he said, "... we are coming upon a new stage in our cultural

³Though there remain Biblical literalists and a few unreconstructed liberals, and even a few Barthians who have not moved ahead with Barth, who would not identify themselves with this consensus, the bulk of our Christian educators are no longer sharply divided along Fundamentalist, Modernist, Barthian or even Tillichian, lines.

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evolution where the Christian appraisal of the world and existence gains a significance it has not had in many a generation. This is our opportunity, our challenge, our decisive moment to develop a *paideia* which expresses in contemporary form the Christian view of the world, of man, and of destiny."⁴ This is a very large order, and I doubt that the emerging consensus among Christian educators (or theologians) suffices for such a task. Moreover, the ideals of a culture are not added *ab extra* by theoreticians but are the expressions of the functional norms of a society. Indeed, it would seem that there is entirely inadequate appreciation among Christians of the extent to which we are all — Christians and non-Christians alike — inextricably bound up with the non-Christian *paideia* of our time, that creation of our business community, our great industrial machine, and our intense desire to achieve ever greater mastery over the forces of nature, which enmeshes us all.⁵

I suspect, therefore, that what we can do in our church colleges at the present time will be modest. Now while discussion of the theoretical bases of Christian education must continue, I wonder whether more widespread inquiry and concerted effort might not now be directed toward the discovery of means for implementing our common convictions about Christian higher education. It is all very well, and necessary, to say that Christian faith influences how we conceive all of life and learning, but it is something else again to make this sufficiently clear and meaningful to the faculties of our church colleges so that it begins to inform their teaching.

The ferment about general education reached a celebrated crystallization in 1946 in the Harvard study *General Education in a Free Society*. After this study had been read and digested, many colleges moved to adopt some of the Harvard recommendations or conducted similar studies on their own campuses with a view to revising their curricula. It did not, apparently, occur to them that it may very well take a Harvard faculty to implement a Harvard plan. We have, to be sure, some "prestige" church-related colleges whose faculties may be well equipped to move ahead in Christian higher education. By all means, let these colleges lead us. But we have between four and five hundred colleges and universities in America which claim some church affiliation, and means must be devised for doing whatever we can to bring to the level of consciousness among as many of the faculty of these colleges as possible the problems of the nature of the Christian college.

I am not unaware of the movements over the past few years which have been directed to one phase or another of this problem. To cite only a few, the

⁴Albert C. Outler, "Theological Foundations for Christian Higher Education," *op. cit.*, Vol. XXXVII (Autumn, 1954), p. 205.

⁵This point has been forcefully argued in an address by Wm. G. Pollard which appeared in *ibid.*, pp. 247-256.

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Student Christian Movement, the Don's Movement in England, the Faculty Christian Fellowship in America. The boards of education of our various churches and of the National Council of Churches are directing a great deal of excellent literature to our church colleges. Foundations have sponsored conferences and seminars devoted to the problems of the Christian teacher in higher education. Finally, the two great convocations of Christian colleges held in 1954 and 1958 represent a large-scale effort to deal with the problem of the Christian college in our time.

The fact, however, is that our church colleges are staffed by thousands of devoted Christian laymen, well trained in their specialties, but largely ignorant of historical and contemporary theological movements or of current thought in educational philosophy. And this is not all. Speaking of the social turmoil in Europe at the time of the last great war, Ortega y Gasset said, "The convulsive situation in Europe at the present moment is due to the fact that the average Englishman, the average Frenchman, the average German are uncultured: they are ignorant of the essential system of ideas concerning the world and man, which belong to our time. This average person is the new barbarian, a laggard behind the contemporary civilization, archaic and primitive in contrast with his problems, which are grimly, relentlessly modern. This new barbarian is above all the professional man, more learned than ever before, but at the same time more uncultured — the engineer, the physician, the lawyer, the scientist."⁶ Many of us who teach in church colleges are, alas, also among the group of which Ortega speaks. The presidents of our Christian colleges would, no doubt, like to provide themselves with teachers who are not only competent in their respective fields, but who are living at the "height of the times," to employ another phrase of Ortega's, but with the best will in the world and even with all the money they cannot accumulate such faculties because persons such as those we need do not exist in large numbers.

An Appeal for Help

What, then, can be done within our church colleges? This article is not designed to answer this question but to appeal for help. The following proposals, therefore, are not intended to be definitive answers nor are they novel. All of them are being tried in various ways in our colleges.

First, there must be genuine administrative concern that there be initiated among faculty a many-sided conversation centered around the problem of the relationship between Christian faith, learning and the world. The administration's first responsibility, of course, is to provide competent instruction in the various disciplines, and faculty may not be chosen with primary reference to their

⁶Jose Ortega y Gasset, *Mission of the University* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1946), pp. 44-45.

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theological concerns any more than with reference to their personal piety. But, also, a Christian college should not be blind to the theological interests of its faculty and, other things being equal, at least some persons should be included in the faculty who have an explicit desire to take Christian thought seriously in more than a personal way. Colleges whose administrators understand that interest in the centrality of faith cannot be commanded nor a program for making it central imposed from above, are fortunate. On the other hand, administrators cannot simply sit back and wait for this concern to evince itself spontaneously among the faculty. Wise administrators will discover sensible ways of uncovering this concern and encouraging its development.

One problem which administrators will most certainly encounter is faculty complaint that while they might like to attend lectures, seminars, and student discussions they do not have time. I would simply observe that people, even faculty people, frequently have more time than they suppose for what they are really interested in, but I leave the resolution of the time problem, where it genuinely exists, up to the administrators!

Second, the departments of Bible or religion have a responsibility. To be sure, they have traditionally been supposed to carry the entire burden and this is not only unfair but impossible. All our disciplines are more or less isolated from one another for reasons we all know, and this includes religion which, of all disciplines, should not be isolated. When it is isolated, it is not religion! Imaginative Bible teaching is rarer than it should be. A teaching of the history of the ancient Hebrews in which their views of God and his activities on behalf of man, of the world, and of man's nature, and so on, are not made clear and relevant to contemporary views on the same subjects, is largely fruitless. It would seem to go without saying that Bible teaching which is not explicitly post-critical leaves the student unprepared to cope with a variety of problems which he will encounter in the general study of history, of other religions and of science. Religion courses which are not taught with constant reference to other academic disciplines and to the contemporary world scene leave religion isolated and non-functional in the lives and thinking of students. All this, I am aware, is easy to point out but difficult to do anything about, especially when a Bible teacher faces his religiously illiterate students and knows that he will have them for one semester only or, at best, two, during their entire college career. This is why the responsibility for making Christian faith relevant to the entire academic program cannot rest exclusively with the department of religion.

It should also be observed that while the teacher of religion cannot become *ex officio* the self-appointed leader of the faculty, he should cooperate to the fullest in inter-disciplinary communication. All of us are to a greater or lesser extent among Ortega's "new barbarians" so that we find talking across departmental lines difficult. But we should try. In our own college, I have found that those

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most willing to do this sort of thing are the natural scientists. This is encouraging.

Third, the chaplain is certainly more than the *pater familias* of the campus. He may play a variety of roles depending upon his personality and particular competencies, but he has a peculiar responsibility for working at the problem of the Christian college. Dr. Donovan Smucker, chaplain at Lake Forest College, says of his office, "While burdened with the usual fixed institutional responsibilities, the chaplain should raise theological and philosophical questions that launch a dialogue across all departments and segments of campus life. When Mr. Khrushchev was first in the United States, Marquis Childs observed . . . 'What we are witnessing is a dialogue of the deaf. There is a despairing sense that neither side wishes to hear what the other is saying. It is a deafness conditioned by decades of fear, suspicion, and naked hostility.' It is precisely this dialogue of the deaf which must be overcome as the chaplain enters into a genuine dialogue of the concerned."⁷

Fourth, those faculty who share the concern we are discussing must show a willingness to express it. Here we face a dilemma in which a choice will have to be made. No professional academic person in the twentieth century can hope fully "to keep us" in his field. Simply to read the leading journals in one's own language would be impossible for most of us. Some of us are simply going to have to sacrifice something somewhere. It goes without saying that we must keep abreast of developments in our respective fields sufficiently to do good teaching, but some of us somewhere along the line are going to have to give up something in order to devote some of our time to this matter of Christian thought in the college. This is the sort of thing which cannot be left up to specialists. We do not want a group of persons whose specialty is "the church-related college." Witness what happened when we created a special class of "educationists" cut off from the subject matter and the total context of their calling.

I know that it is not just the demands of our particular fields that limit our time but our participation in that great American way of life, the committee system. Perhaps some day administrators and faculties will realize that we can get along with fewer committees or with less frequent meetings of those we have. I resist temptation to be acid further about committees. Jokes aplenty, enshrining great wisdom, have been made on the subject already.

Fifth, I should like to appeal to our theological seminaries for help. Many of our colleges were founded to prepare ministers or to serve as preparatory schools to the seminary, and there has been a long struggle on the part of some colleges to free themselves from "clerical domination" and, though I know of some colleges where the "heavy hand" of the ordained minister and the trained theologian is still felt, I think this is the exception rather than the rule today.

⁷"The Dilemma of the Chaplaincy in Church-Related Colleges," *Nexus* (Spring, 1960), pp. 9-10.

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It is interesting to observe the number of professional theologians who are annually invited to address laymen's groups — the Faculty Christian Fellowship gatherings are a case in point. In situations where both church college and theological seminary are parts of the same university or exist in close proximity to one another, it would seem that there is excellent opportunity for two-way conversation that might benefit both sides. While many college faculty are still suspicious of, or at least feel inadequate in the presence of theologians, I sometimes wonder whether theological professors are not so busy teaching their students to communicate the gospel that they do not have time to talk with those of us in the colleges who also have a stake in communicating the gospel in the widest sense of the term. Dr. Smucker, to whom we have referred, has said "A Christian association of separated saints without powers of communication is under a death sentence."⁵ How much more obviously should saints communicate with saints in the furtherance of their related tasks!

Sixth, and finally, I would suggest that students must become involved in these activities at all possible points for are they not the college's final reason for being? Genuine intellectual concern and involvement seem to be conspicuously lacking among American college students today if we may credit our own experience and believe the reports of others. Where better than in the church-related college should concern and involvement take place? I am all for allowing students to observe and, upon proper occasion, to participate in, faculty discussion. Students who, in our own college, were allowed to participate recently in faculty discussions expressed themselves as having had one of the most intellectually stimulating experiences of their college career, indeed, as having had one of the *only* such stimulating experiences in college! Let faculty disagree and even argue heatedly among themselves over significant educational matters in the presence of students and see what happens. My guess is that the students will not go away disillusioned about their teachers but awakened to issues about which they were totally unconcerned.

In making the foregoing suggestions there is no intention to ignore the fact that a young person's college experience is not confined to "intellectual involvement." The total environment of the student during his four years on campus most certainly affects — or should affect! — the development of the "whole man." The idea advanced in this paper is that if we do not involve the student in understanding the nature of the Christian faith and its relationship to life and learning, there is no justification for the church-related college as such.

Perhaps if our church educators, administrators and theologians can be persuaded to devote more time and thought to the devising of ways to awaken our church college faculties to the problems of the Christian college in our day we shall be able to move ahead despite our confusions and limitations.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 6.

Theology and Prayer

THOMAS A. LANGFORD

Theology and prayer are inseparable. Each implies the other and each needs the other. This paper is an attempt to clarify how theology is related to the thoughtful content of prayer and how prayer is related to the living content of theology.

The Relation of Theology to Prayer

The community of man and God in prayer has a fundamental place in Christian experience. The relationship actualized in prayer is grounded as is the total life of faith in the response of man to the gracious self-giving of God. The Christian life is rooted in such community and matures in the continual nourishment of this community. Maturity in faith inevitably involves the effort to understand the nature of the faith one holds and the concern to give it explicit expression. The grounding of theology upon faith and the exercise of theology within the context of faith points also to a basic dependence of theology on prayer.

Prayer is the primary description of faith in action, and as such it is essential to all knowing and doing for the Christian. In his *Ecclesiastical Polity* Richard Hooker asks the question, "Is not the name of prayer usual to signify even all the service that ever we do unto God?" Then he answers "yes," because it shows "that there is in religion no acceptable duty which devout invocation of the name of God doth not either presuppose or infer."¹ The answer to Hooker's question must be positive. Positive because to pray is to be surrendered, obedient and ready to do His will. This is the service to which the Christian is called: "To will to do His will." All other service "unto God" is an extension of this relationship. Not only is the Christian's life of service, which is his ethical existence, rooted in the community with God, but also his intellectual life finds its roots here. Theology is dependent upon the community actualized in prayer. Thus theology is *possible* only in so far as it is the attempt of faithful men to

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¹*The Works of Richard Hooker*, arranged by John Keble, seventh edition, revised by R. W. Church and F. Paget (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), II, Book V, ch. xxxiii, 115-116.

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express the content of their faith. But at the same time theology is *necessary* if the meaning and significance of faith is to be communicated to others.

Discussion of theology has long been concerned with the question, "Who can be a theologian?" Is there a *theologia irrogenitorum*, a theology of the unregenerate? The answers to this question have been varied, but the implication of the foregoing remarks would force one to answer the question negatively. Theology is a function of the church, of those who participate in the faith and by virtue of such participation attempt to give expression to that faith. This is not to say that the theologian cannot learn from others who do not share his faith nor is it to claim that those outside the circle of faith cannot discuss theology. Obviously they can and do. People with other commitments may and do help the theologian to clarify what he means. They may and do help the theologian to say what he wants to say. But they cannot tell the theologian what he *ought* to mean, or what his faith gives him to say. Such help as those outside the circle of faith can give is to be openly acknowledged and welcomed but such help is always instrumental and not a gift of content.

The content of faith is not in the possession of any man, not even the theologian. But as one participates in the life of faith he lives in a relationship which requires interpretation. For the Christian theologian, as for all Christians, this relationship is with God who in Jesus Christ provides the "object" of theological reflection (an "object" which is nonetheless always "subject" as it is God's revelation of Himself to man rather than man's exploration and sounding-out of God). The man who has been grasped by and who responds to the Christ is the one who is called "Christian." And only such a man is able to go on to interpret this source of faith and thereby be designated "theologian." Herein lies the possibility of theology.

Prayer is a means of grace, a means of participating in the life of God, which alone makes an appropriation of the revelatory event possible. "Prayer," Richard Baxter is reported to have said, "is the breath of the new creature."² As such, prayer is also the breath of theology. Karl Barth makes the claim that dogmatics is "possible only as an act of faith," and this is to say, that "prayer is the attitude apart from which dogmatics is impossible."³

It is only in the posture of prayer that theology prepares itself to hear the truth. For in prayer man acknowledges the revelation of God in such a way that it becomes revelation for him making it possible for him to do the work of a theologian. This is not to claim that piety even in the deepest sense is all that is necessary for the task of theology. It is obvious that other talents are needful

²As quoted in D. M. M'Intyre, *The Hidden Life of Prayer*, third edition (London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, Limited, n.d.), p. 20.

³*Church Dogmatics, Doctrine of The Word of God*, trans. G. T. Thompson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), I, 1, 25.

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and that a discipline of life and mind are indispensable. But it is only in the relationship expressed by prayerful faith that theology has its initiation and its continual renewal.

The necessity of theology also is rooted in the experience of encounter which lives by prayer. Theology is a part of the faithful service rendered to God. Just as man's ethical life is grounded here so also is his intellectual life, just as his hands must be committed to this service so also must his mind be committed. The whole man responds to God. To some who have responded has been given the gift of teaching, and for these the theological task is their vocation. But at the same time every believer is a theologian, if not technically, at least to the extent of being ready to testify responsibly and intelligently to the faith that is in him.

The very nature of Christian faith requires that it be shared. But how shall it be shared except it be witnessed to by the church? How shall it be witnessed to except it be understood? Theology seeks this understanding in the service of the church, especially in the service of the preaching of the church. Theology is not an end in itself. Rather it has the role of mediator, or perhaps of a mid-wife whose task is to bring faith to a self-understanding in order that the source and object of faith may be authentically witnessed to. If the Christian life is necessarily a life of witnessing by word and by act, then theology is necessary.

Theological Interpretation of Prayer

The relationship of prayer and theology is mutually conditioning. Prayer constitutes the context in which theology takes place and theology provides help in understanding the meaning and nature of prayer.

Professor Austin Farrer puts the relationship in a striking way when he writes, "Prayer is the active use or exercise of faith; and the creed defines the contours of that world on which faith trains her eyes. These statements are, or ought to be, platitudes. No dogma deserves its place unless it is prayable, and no Christian deserves his dogmas who does not pray them."⁴

The implications are clear. Prayer gives life and nourishment to theology; theology gives guidance and counsel to prayer. Theology must take prayer seriously in order to explicate the nature and meaning of prayer and in order to relate prayer to the whole context of Christian doctrine.

To state that it is the task of theology to interpret prayer is not to argue that theology begins with prayer in such a way that prayer becomes the norm for theological construction. This is not the case. The norm, the center, the beginning point of theology is the event of Jesus Christ, and it is in reflection,

⁴*Lord, I Believe* (London: The Church Union, 1955), p. 8.

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in faith, on this event and on its reception that theology has its grounding. But prayer as an expression of man's reception of the Christ advent does constitute a subject for theological understanding and no theology is adequate which does not take prayer into account.

H. R. MacKintosh in his book *Types of Modern Theology* makes the arresting statement that "nothing betrays a man's genuine standpoint in theology more unerringly than his view of prayer."⁵ This quotation provides a touch stone, and an apt one, by which it is possible to drive deeply into the heart of a theological system. With this word in mind we shall turn our attention to prayer as theologically interpreted.

Prayer must be understood in the context of the gospel and must be judged in its form and content by the gospel. The understanding of the gospel will differ according to theological orientation. Nevertheless the following suggestions while they are made from a given perspective also have relevance for any theological construction and must be taken into account.

The community of I-Thou encounter between man and God, the story of which we call gospel, is a gift of God. For the Christian the gift is given to man in and through the Christ-event. Prayer as an essential part of the covenant experience is also dependent upon the gracious initiative of God. Thus prayer in its essence is thankful response. It is the utterance of the one who knows that even before he seeks he is being sought and that even before he yearns for the community of prayer God has expressed more radical concern for him.

Prayer implies the participation of the Christian in the life of God. To pray is to be in community with the God-head. The New Testament speaks of prayer in terms of relationship to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. All three modes of the God-head are involved. In this sense prayer might be called the believer's participation in the active communion of the Son with the Father in the unity of the Holy Spirit. Such a relationship is not to be grasped by man, it is not man's to claim as his own, rather, with humility the believer accepts this participation as a gift from God. A gift of which he was not worthy but which God has graciously bestowed.

This understanding of prayer raises the questions of man's freedom and God's providence and their relationship to each other in the act of prayer. Dr. George Buttrick claims that Jesus in his teaching about prayer presupposes man's freedom.⁶ Freedom is implied in the Christian understanding of the creation and fall of man. It is also involved in the concept of the covenant relation which God established with man. To love God is the decisive and free act of the individual

⁵*Types of Modern Theology* (London: Nisbet and Company, Limited, 1937), p. 92.

⁶George A. Buttrick, *Prayer* (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942), p. 55.

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self. Forced love is not love. So prayer as man's response to God and as a part of the covenant community with God implies man's free decision.

But man's freedom is not unbridled. On the contrary in falling from the relationship with God man forsakes his freedom for God and becomes slave to himself and exercises his freedom as freedom from God. In this situation man is in need of help from beyond himself. Freedom in its true and positive sense, therefore, is not independent of God's grace. Donald Baillie has rightly pointed to the fact that one should not think of the area of God's action and the area of man's action as being sharply delimited. Rather, as Baillie goes on to assert, the Christian person knows himself to be free, and he knows his actions to be his very own; and yet he knows also that when he makes a right choice he cannot congratulate himself, he must refer the initiative and the gracious ability to God. He says in humility, "I, yet not I, but the grace of God."⁷ In this relationship the Christian knows himself as one who is responsible, as one who is called to commit himself freely in thankful love to God. And yet he knows that before he moves into this relationship God has already been moving toward him, and, indeed, has inspired the movement of his heart. So also in prayer. The seeking, knocking and asking are predicated upon the prior prompting of God. It is in prayer that the Christian knows the full impact of Paul's comment in Romans 8:26-27 about the Spirit which intercedes for us in such a way that the full burden of the heart is laid upon a single sigh. Such is the dependence of the Christian and no less in prayer than in any other act of faithful response.

Another confession of the man of faith is that God is providentially over-arching man's life and history. Again this is rooted in the event of Jesus Christ as Paul clearly affirms in Romans 8:31-39. Upon the love of God in Christ Paul is willing to stake his history and the history of his world. This belief in providence is not fatalistic. Providence, as the New Testament consistently implies, and no more so than in the prayers of Jesus, is not unmindful of man, nor does it move with celestial indifference to man. Providence includes man and takes him into account. Man's history and his activity in history are not annulled but used as the instruments of God's providential governance. "God's will shall be done!" the Christian affirms, and with hope he goes out to meet his providence. He seeks to obediently play his part in the plan of God for history. Prayer is a part of the life of faith in which one can affirm providence and affirm the providential readiness of God to hear the groanings of our spirits. Roger Hazelton has rightly said, "Prayer is what we do about Providence and because of Providence. Hence, they stand or fall together in the Christian life."⁸ Prayer stands therefore as

⁷Donald M. Baillie, *God Was In Christ* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), pp. 114 f.

⁸Roger Hazelton, *God's Way With Man* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1956), p. 181.


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one of the most obvious attestations to the believer's faith that God is alive and able to assert Himself in man's world and experience.

This is not to imply that man's role in providence is only passive acceptance. Rather, it is in the Biblical teaching on intercessory prayer that we find an active note sounded. Perhaps no other aspect of prayer has given rise to more questions. But prayer as intercession denotes both the way in which life has been ordered by God in terms of man's interrelationship and the responsibility of man in God's providential plan. Our prayers become one of the component factors in a total situation which includes not only physical nature and social forces, but also the thought and will of persons. Again to quote Hazelton, "We can say that if the *shape* of prayer is request made of God, its *substance* is a response to him; our asking is always in addition a lifting up of what we ask for, an abandonment to Providence."⁹

This discussion of prayer in relation to the initiative of God and to providence is quite limited and constitutes only a suggestion. But perhaps by these suggestions the necessity of a theological interpretation of prayer has been indicated and some of the emphases it ought to take into account have been noted.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 188-189.



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Book Reviews

Michael Foster: *Mystery and Philosophy* *

BASIL MITCHELL

Mystery and Philosophy by Michael Foster. London: SCM Press, 1957, 96 pages, \$2.75.

I have been asked to say something this evening about Michael Foster's book *Mystery and Philosophy*. I think that all of us here will have a vivid recollection of the man himself and for me to treat his work in the wholly detached spirit of the reviewer would be inappropriate, indeed, impossible. It would be pointless not to draw upon the reserves of sympathy and understanding which must come from personal friendship. But a friend is pre-eminently someone you can argue freely with, and I don't think it would be any sort of tribute to Michael Foster if one set out to interpret but no longer to argue with him. The remarks I shall make this evening are based upon a short discussion of this book which took place among a small group at Oxford, at which he was present.

No brief discussion could do justice to the book's simplicity, clarity, modesty and balanced learning. Here, the reader is bound to feel, is a man communicating the fruits of genuine meditation, and only an equally meditated comment would be really appropriate.

There are six chapters with the following titles: "Mystery and the Philosophy of Analysis," "Mystery and Greek Philosophy," "Mystery in the Bible," "Science and Mystery," "Ethics and Mystery," "Hellenic and Biblical Thought-models."

Chapter I argues that the philosophy of analysis is based on the assumption that there are no mysteries. Whatever can be said can be said clearly. It therefore rules out *ex hypothesi* the possibility of revelation. "Mystery involves revelation and vice versa. To exclude revelation is to exclude by an initial assumption what Christians include" (p. 27). However, this may be, in its way, a good thing because it expels bogus non-Biblical mystification from our culture, leaving a room swept and garnished for the entry of a purified Christian faith. Chapter 2 argues that for the Greeks mystery was part of the world, and science and philosophy were the conversion of the soul to full knowledge of a reality which was conceived as thoroughly intelligible. Modern science and modern philosophy have demolished the conception of reason upon which this position was based, and Biblical Christianity is on their side. For, as Chapter 3 makes clear, the God of the Bible is a God who hides himself, who makes himself known

*A contribution to an informal symposium held in Oxford in memory of Michael Foster by some of his friends.

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only by the revelation of himself in grace. God speaks not to reason, as the Greeks thought, but through flesh when the flesh repents. He is hidden even when he reveals himself. "The incarnation, as Kierkegaard said, is the assumption of an incognito. Revelation, therefore, is something that some will see and others will not. It follows that it is something for which there can be no scientific evidence." Chapter 4 develops this theme and contrasts scientific knowledge with knowledge of God. God and only God is immune from scientific test. It is a mistake to look for pockets of reality within the scheme of nature, including human nature, which will remain scientifically inexplicable. "What does this leave outside the limits of science? God." Chapter 5 on ethics develops themes which have already been stated. The morality, even the Christian morality of European civilization, has been based on the Hellenic model of reason vs. passion. It is a heroic morality which is now decaying and which Christians have no interest in preserving. The characteristically modern moralities are humanist and utilitarian and the Christian differs from them only in seeing holiness rather than happiness as the end. The last chapter, on Hellenic and Biblical thought-models, reasserts that which has already been suggested earlier, that modern science and philosophy are expelling the Hellenic elements in our thought, with a resulting convergence between analytic and Christian criticism. The philosophical critic says "You do not understand the meaning of what you say;" the believer says "I do not, of course, understand the meaning of what I am saying." The difference will be whether these statements are made with or without faith, faith namely that God uses human language as a vehicle of revelation. "Faith," says Michael in the closing paragraph of the book, ". . . is not just another pipeline for the supply of a supplementary set of truths which in other respects are like the truths of science. It is directed upon mystery, as revelation springs from mystery, and as prayer seems properly directed upon mysterious objects."

Even this bald summary is enough to bring out some of the most notable features of the book.

1. It is an extremely radical book and one which is very modern in its approach. Michael shows little respect for tradition as such. In the name of Biblical theology he is prepared to jettison a great deal of what is still to be found in the Christian tradition. He is a true iconoclast, ready to demolish all ikons in the name of the God of whom no representation can be made. This means that he is very close in spirit to much of modern analytical philosophy. It has often been said of him that he felt out of touch with contemporary philosophy, but this was true, I think, more of its methods than of its aims. He differed from contemporary philosophers chiefly in not being versed in their techniques and in realizing that they had presuppositions, which they themselves were often not prepared to recognize. But these presuppositions he for the most part shared.

2. In spite of its brief compass, the book exemplifies Michael Foster's

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penetration as a historian of ideas, his quite remarkable capacity for getting at the essence of a philosophical outlook, being prepared, if necessary, to back up his interpretation with detailed references to particular texts.

3. I think it goes without saying that the book is the work of one who had pondered deeply on Christian belief and experience.

My impression is that, nevertheless, these three characteristics never quite settle down with each other. Michael appears throughout to link together the concepts of mystery, revelation, faith, profundity and to contrast them with science, intelligibility, reason, clarity. God, the only mystery, on the one hand: the world, including man, on the other. In drawing this contrast as sharply as he does, Michael is following out the radical program of the analytical philosopher. There are a number of questions I should like to ask about this.

(a) To what extent, in developing this theme, is Michael taking up a standpoint from within Christianity and working out the relationships between, for example, faith, revelation and mystery as the Christian sees them; so that revelation is the revelation of God, as we have been taught to know Him, faith is the proper human response to this revelation and mystery is, shall we say, wherever God is in truth to be found? And to what extent is he taking up the standpoint of the historian of ideas, tracing the history of concepts like those of revelation, mystery, faith in human thought?

It seems to me that sometimes he takes up the one standpoint, sometimes the other. Take, for example, these two statements: "Mystery involves revelation and vice versa;" "It is important to distinguish biblical mystery from the mystery of pagan super-naturalism." The first of these sounds like an essentially theological statement, made from a Christian standpoint. Genuine mystery involves revelation; genuine revelation involves mystery. The second sounds like an observation in the history of thought. One could paraphrase, "It is important to distinguish the biblical conception of mystery from the conception of mystery found in pagan supernaturalism." Or take his reflections upon Otto. Otto has been quoted on "ghosts . . . the wholly other which has no place in our scheme of reality" (p. 44). Michael comments, "Otto's passage in fact reminds us that we have to deal not only with two concepts of mystery (the Greek and the Biblical) but with a third which is designated by the words 'weird,' 'uncanny,' 'occult,' 'magical.' This third sense of mystery is the one which in the language of everyday would spring most readily to mind. It is congruous with the beliefs of a pagan religion." Elsewhere, however, he says "Revelation is not an answer to our questions; God is prevenient in Revelation. Mystery involves revelation and vice-versa" (p. 27).

Putting these two together we might be tempted to conclude that the weird, uncanny, occult and magical, being mysteries, involve revelation, and that God is,

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therefore, convenient in them. We are obviously not intended to draw any such conclusion and it is unfair to juxtapose these widely separated quotations. Yet I think that Michael does oscillate between these standpoints, without indicating which of them he occupies at any particular moment, or how he would relate them; and this makes for confusion.

(b) Am I right in thinking that this ambiguity is evident in what he has to say about faith? Speaking from the standpoint of the historian of ideas, Michael is inclined to regard any interpretation of life which is not (in the modern sense) a part of science as a matter of "faith," in the sense that it is a matter of working out the implications of a given set of presuppositions or "thought-model." (I am not sure, on the evidence of this book, whether he thought modern science itself the expression of such a "faith" or not). Thus Greek science was a matter of faith, being based on the presupposition of a self-revealing truth. Whatever is outside the boundaries of science will be the battleground of competing faiths, in this sense, and, in a corresponding sense perhaps, competing revelations. What we (following the Greeks) call rationality is, insofar as it is not part of science, a sort of faith. From the point of view of cultural history Marxism, existentialism, scientific humanism and Christianity are all "faiths." Once accepted they yield their adherents interpretations of life, which will appear to them more or less rational and profound. From this point of view what confronts us, outside science, is not a choice between God's revelation of Himself and a host of rival pseudo- or partial-revelations (this is how it looks to the Christian), but a multiplicity of competing options. The familiar question then arises, looked at from this point of view how does one choose between them? Not by exercise of reason because, *ex hypothesi*, outside science reason is no impartial arbiter; and science is incompetent to judge. Not by asking which confirms and is confirmed by our profoundest insights, because these are determined by our initial act of faith. Michael directly tackles this problem only once in this book, in connection with Hellenic and Biblical thought-models. There he says, "The question for philosophy is, which model illuminates? We are never actually compelled to give up one model in favor of another, we can discuss the problem of morals on the Greek model . . . which model shall we choose?" This, I think, is just. My difficulty is that his own account of thinking in this book does not allow for a sort of thinking by which we might decide which model illuminates and, therefore, which we should choose.

Michael exhibits a strong tendency in his book to identify reason with the exercise of scientific method. If this identification is made it follows that any intellectual capacity which is directed upon mysteries is not reason. Rationality is exhausted by science, and profundity by faith. There are no natural mysteries and there is no reasoning about supernatural mysteries. Against this one is tempted to protest (i) that there are rational disciplines such as history and philos-

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ophy, which are not and are not likely to become scientific, whose practitioners may display insight more or less profound; and that human beings may be mysterious in ways which can be penetrated, if at all, not by science, or by religious faith, but by imaginative sympathy; (ii) that those of us who are believers sometimes think hard about theological questions, which only arise in a context of mystery, and doubtless we think about them more or less profoundly. What goes on in our heads on these occasions is very much like what goes on there when we are tackling a question in history or philosophy. An unbelieving philosopher who criticizes Michael's book is not doing something totally different from what Michael was doing when he wrote it or what I, a believing philosopher, am doing now.

My feeling then is that the contrast between God and his acts, the realm of mystery to be apprehended by faith on the one hand, and the world, the realm of science, to be apprehended by reason on the other, is altogether too simple and too absolute.

I think that what, more than anything, inhibited Michael from recognizing any rational process which might have as its object mysteries was the thought that this supposes an impartial thinker, confident in his tools, putting God to the test, which he rightly felt to be theologically outrageous; together with the thought that, if this description were correct, there is no explaining why two equally well-instructed and well-equipped people come down on different sides. But these objections are not decisive. The impartial speculative thinker, confident in his tools, is precisely the person who does *not* believe in mysteries, whereas it is a precondition of faith to accept the possibility of mystery. Here Michael throws a great deal of light by insisting on the impossibility of predicting in advance just what the realization of a mystery would be like. It follows that if anyone said "a mysterious world would have such and such characteristics; our world has/has not these characteristics; therefore it is/is not mysterious" he would be altogether missing the point about mystery. Rational reflection about a religious mystery would have to take the form of meditation upon the alleged revelation in an expectant but critical frame of mind. One would have to lay oneself open to be convinced; one could not claim to know in advance precisely what evidence would be required to convince, but one would not pass *anything*. Laying oneself open to be convinced might not be a simple or an easy matter. It might involve a deliberate stripping off of preconceptions as to what a revelation should be like, together with a conscious readiness to take up unfamiliar and unwelcome postures, like that of prayer, and to associate with uncongenial people like Bishops and curates. Worse than this, it might involve unforeseeable modifications of one's personality, which for a modern intellectual is the most alarming prospect of all. This is all very different from our customary picture of the reasonable man as a confident, independent judge.

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When I have said all this, I am aware that from much of it Michael might not dissent. He says, "God is hidden, but reveals himself. He speaks through flesh, but perhaps only when the flesh repents." I am thinking of reason as part of "flesh" not as some quasi-divine element in man's make up. If we recognize a revelation, it is our flesh which recognizes it, in the only way our flesh *can* recognize such things. Michael speaks of a "repentance of the intellect," but this, I take it, does not involve any abdication of its functions.

Theology: In Conversation and at Home

BRUCE CARLSON

New Accents in Contemporary Theology by Roger Hazelton. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960, 140 pages, \$3.00.

Professor Hazelton has undertaken an enterprise which is altogether too large for a book of 140 pages, and which calls for considerably more learning than any single man can have at hand. Each chapter implicitly demands a full book. Yet the author is largely successful in the execution of his intention to provide "a series of explorations into different kinds of theological terrain, with a view toward whetting the reader's appetite for more intensive inquiry into these directions" (p. 7). Dr. Hazelton's book serves this purpose, but, as he notes several times, it is inadequate for thorough appropriation of recent study in any of the non-theological disciplines.

The first section of the book is concerned with "theology as conversation," first with the arts, then with science and philosophy. Recalling the four centuries of iconoclastic Protestantism which now lie behind us, Dr. Hazelton is anxious to notice the increasing attention being paid to the arts by contemporary theology. He suggests, moreover, that the first stage of this relationship, in which theology used the arts as an index to contemporary nuances of culture, has matured. We are now on the threshold of a more genuine dialogue in which both theology and art are contributing together toward a significant understanding of tragedy, myth, symbol, and image. The important distinction of this new phase should enable the conversation between theologian and artist to assume a more honestly substantial level.

Dr. Hazelton is at special pains to allow for the very necessary integrity of art itself. Much of the suspicion which artists entertain about the church has resulted from the Philistine attempts of theologians to convert everything good into an expression of covert Christian inspiration. While, for instance, Camus' writing may have very definite implications for Christian belief, Camus himself is both slandered and weakened if he is posthumously converted to Christianity.

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"Although any subject may have dimensions that are ultimately theological, these are not necessarily intrinsic or inherent in it. They have to be pointed out . . . [so] that dimensions of theological meaning and relevance are brought to bear upon the subject, instead of being developed solely from within it (p. 19). Poetry is poetry; it is not religion. Neither, as Matthew Arnold contended, is poetry capable of saving us. Nor must the Christian judge the theology of the artist. "But it is not the artist's so-called 'theology' which the Christian critic has to put to the test, but the congruity or fitness of his work as it is measured by both historic and contemporary Christian experience" (p. 22).

Dean Hazelton has demonstrated his awareness of the necessity for both the theologian and artist to maintain the integrity of their disciplines. The major shortcoming of this discussion, however, is the absence of a direct encounter between Karl Barth's theology of the "other," and, on the basis of this theology, the possibility of a significant Christian aesthetic. Those who find their theology largely informed by Barth, and who also take contemporary art seriously, will wish Dr. Hazelton had provided a *modus vivendi* for these two contemporary theological accents.

Although this book was originally contemplated as a full-blown discussion of theology and the arts, the second conversation between theology and the sciences develops as well as the first. The author notes that the convenient division of labor between religion and science is not legitimately operative in the mid-twentieth century. No longer can theology temporarily make capital on the dark spots in scientific inquiry and still expect to maintain, over the long run, any permanent domain. While Dr. Hazelton correctly remarks that Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy" was incorrectly used by liberal theologians, one wishes that he had remarked about the effect this observation had in forcing scientists to admit the subjectivity of their own discipline, and thereby enhancing the opportunities for fruitful dialogue.

The conversations with psychology and philosophy are also well under way. The author notes that the secular psychology of Freud taught theology more about man and sin, and very unambiguously, than any man since Paul or Augustine. Yet this dialogue is seriously underdeveloped because of serious barriers in terminology and interest. The jargon of the clinicist is extremely esoteric, and the measurements of the behaviorists are often irrelevant and confounded by inadequate rationale. Dr. Hazelton calls attention to the important work being done in this field by Hiltner, May, Outler, and others.

Moving to recent developments in philosophy, the author acknowledges the challenges of modern philosophy, happily noting the modifications being made of early "Vienna Circle" positivism by followers of Wittgenstein. There is little doubt, however, that the most far-reaching benefits of the conversation between theology and philosophy shall develop in conjunction with existentialism.

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Dr. Hazelton's appraisal of the existentialists is realistic and knowledgeable. "A final benefit to be conferred by existential philosophy upon Christian theology is the way in which it brings home to us the genuine risk bound up in faith itself" (p. 57).

One might wish the author had spoken more directly to some of the specific theological issues which have incapacitated this dialogue between theology, science, philosophy, and psychology. His analysis of "nature opening upward to God" is trenchant and original, but the implications of a doctrine of incarnation might also be helpful.

The second major section of the book deals with "theology at home." Dr. Hazelton understands that rigorous work must be done within the theological circle before Christianity can enter into profitable bilateral discussion. He begins his discussion of contemporary theology with the publication of Barth's commentary on Romans, the point at which, the author contends, liberalism began its demise. This also announced the beginnings of the new biblical theology with its emphasis upon the unity of Scripture, the divine-human encounter, and the understanding of Christianity as a faith about history. The discussion about history is especially instructive, pointing out that biblical theology "... generally uses history in a very special and 'non-historical' sense. The sharp lines that are drawn between secular and sacred history, the rendering of *Heilsgeschichte*, ... all these spell logical confusion and semantic isolation" (p. 66).

Dr. Hazelton demands that these three contemporary stresses in biblical theology must be reworked from both theological and secular perspectives before they will be adequate for profitable discussion with historians. The author suggests, in this regard, that Bultmann's de-mythologizing be rephrased as "re-mythologizing," as Bultmann himself suggested when he remarked that "its aim is not to eliminate the mythological statements but to interpret them" (*Jesus Christ and Mythology*, p. 18).

Moving from his interpretation of contemporary theology to the doctrine of the church, Mr. Hazelton exposes the dangers of misunderstood "ecumenical" attempts at unity. "The church, any and every form of church, is by its nature ecumenical, which means that it both reflects and requires the unity bestowed upon it by its Lord . . . they cease to be ecumenical in their function only when they vitiate or deny the unity in Christ which by their nature they are intended to declare and demonstrate" (p. 89).

The broken wholeness of the church can be healed only when we discover our identity as well as our commonality. Not before we understand what we are shall we be able to understand what both we and our fellow Christians can become. Mr. Hazelton, a bit wary of the "surprising amount of agreement that has been secured" in ecumenical undertakings, insists that solid ecumenical advances can occur only when all parties are not merely tolerant, but fully

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conscious of the fact that ecumenicism must be acceptance which is grounded in God's acceptance of us all through Jesus Christ. The author's succinct and incisive appraisal of the factors which divide Christendom brings the discussion to grass-root levels.

This chapter, however, reflects the scarcity of substantial pneumatological study. Dr. Hazelton correctly proposes that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit may be the most adequate means for fulfilling the demands of unity, although he does not undertake the much needed book on this subject.

The final chapter of Dr. Hazelton's book is the most sensitive expression of "theology as invitation" that I have seen. The warmth of the book itself is imparted by the opening sentence, "There is an old and honorable kind of Christian theology known as apologetics," which quickly moves to a realistic study of what contemporary apologetics must be. Relying upon the philosophy of the existentialists, particularly Jaspers and Marcel, the author examines Karl Barth's strident dictum that the identification of oneself with unbelief precipitates the cessation of faith. Important questions are put to Barth, suggesting that only in the risk of faith can more faith be gained. "Thus faith does not fear exposure to unfaith but demands it. The experience of the great Christian apologists certainly seems to indicate that such an exposure may even be necessary for the very growth of one's faith, not merely for its articulation and definition" (p. 119).

Finally, Mr. Hazelton carefully proscribes the limits to which a Christian may properly go in allowing a scheme for general revelation in the history of religions. He concludes that a Christian must view universal self-disclosure of God to men from a Christian point of view. Despite Christian claims to uniqueness, which the author puts very well, there is something seriously disquieting in the recent claims of men like Ernst Benz (*The Journal of Religion*, January, 1961). An adequate understanding of the relation between the world's religions will probably derive, once again, from increased theological attention to doctrines of the Holy Spirit and Incarnation.

One must conclude, in a balanced appraisal of *New Accents in Contemporary Theology*, that it includes what is basic to theological activity in our time. It also omits a considerable amount of information we should like to have available; but Mr. Hazelton realizes that the days of the encyclopaedists and the systematizers are gone. He has given us what he intended: a critical and sympathetic statement about theological accents in the middle of the century. Every minister and teacher needed Daniel Day Williams' book of 1952; and, since the new thrusts in theology include more people, almost everyone should have Hazelton's book of ten years later.

The Thought of Death

RICHARD W. DAY

The Meaning of Death edited by Herman Feifel. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959, 351 pages, \$6.50.

"Even after looking hard in the literature," says the editor of this symposium, "it is surprising how slim is the systematized knowledge about death. Far too little heed has been given to assessing thoroughly the implications of the meaning of death." This volume, however, is not intended to fill the gap. It admittedly is not "an organized text." The purpose of the book is to throw a "series of spot-lights" on the problem of death as seen from several different perspectives; and as both the editor in the "Preface" and Gardner Murphy in the concluding "Discussion" say, the various articles yield many findings which are worthy of further exploration.

The book is divided into five parts: (1) "Theoretical Outlooks on Death," (2) "Developmental Orientation Toward Death," (3) "Death Concept in Cultural and Religious Fields," (4) "Clinical and Experimental Studies," and (5) the concluding "Discussion." There are chapters by Carl Jung on "The Soul and Death," by Paul Tillich on "The Eternal Now," by Walter Kaufman on "Existentialism and Death," by Herbert Marcuse on "The Idolology of Death," and one on "The Phenomenon of Unexplained Sudden Death in Animals and Man" by Curt Richter. Other chapters contain a great deal of very interesting information about such topics as the child's view of death, time and death in adolescence, attitudes towards death among normal and mentally ill people, personality factors in dying patients, treatment of the dying person, the doctor and death. Still others deal with the social uses of funeral rites, suicide, grief and religion and there are studies of death in relation to modern literature and modern art.

As can be seen from this catalogue, the book is diffuse. However, according to both the editor and the discussant, the theme of the book is the need to face death; but not all of the contributors adhere to the theme and some even oppose it. Carla Gottlieb, for example, says that modern art minimizes the importance of death. "And why should it not do this?" she asks. "It is life that is important, not death."

It may be true, as Murphy says in discussing Gottlieb's article that although "there is a need to face death," there is also a "need to face away from it." But these two directions must be held in dialectical tension. They are not two enterprises that can be compared. As Feifel, the editor, says, "Life is not comprehended truly or lived fully unless the idea of death is grappled with honestly."

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Although most moderns believe that always to remember death is morbid, Kierkegaard pointed out that one can get used to it just as soldiers get acclimated to the noise during a long artillery barrage so that they can hear each other speaking in normal voices. In like manner, one can live a normal healthy life while never forgetting that death is an ever present possibility as well as an eventual certainty. The man who forgets is addressed as "Thou fool!" in a voice that all finally hear when it says, "This night is thy soul required of thee."

But perhaps most moderns do not forget death. In his chapter on "Existentialism and Death," Walter Kaufman says, "I might suppose that I myself am possibly exceptional in frankly living with the vivid certainty that I must die, were it not for the fact that in a recent World War my whole generation — millions of young men — lived with this thought." But even if all these millions did live with the thought of death during war time, and both experience and a survey of the literature would lead many to question the validity of Kaufman's generalization, most of them have since dismissed the thought. Kaufman himself later on speaks of "the commonplace . . . that most men would rather not face up to the certainty that they themselves must die."

Kaufman speaks of this commonplace in answer to these questions: "And Heidegger? Does he not say little indeed?" And if one knew only Kaufman's chapter on the subject, one might conclude that all the existentialists say little indeed on the subject of death, with the possible exception of Sartre, whom Kaufman plays off against Heidegger, as he has done in other places, to the denigration of the latter if not exactly to the aggrandizement of the former. In fact, Kaufman seems more intent upon becoming the Stephen Potter of philosophy than in conveying what the existentialists have said about death. He devotes a good deal of his chapter to playing "one-upmanship" with Heidegger. For example, he says that if there are a few who know *Sein und Zeit* and don't respect it, "this is because most critical readers soon discover that it is not worth their while to go on reading."

Perhaps Heidegger deserves to be called to account for "taking seven pages of dubious arguments, questionable etymologies and extremely arbitrary and obscure coinages and formulations to say in a bizarre way what not only could be said, but what others before him actually have said, in four words;" but why take several pages to make such points in this chapter? And some of the points are as trivial (however annoying) as the fact that Heidegger always refers to Husserl as "E. Husserl" and Kant as "I. Kant." But it is not simply a matter of including so many general criticisms of Heidegger in a chapter entitled "Existentialism and Death." Gardner Murphy finds himself "somewhat uneasy with the need of Kaufman to set Heidegger in opposition" to others such as Freud. But it is not only others such as Freud (and Sartre) that Kaufman opposes to Heidegger. When Kaufman makes the statement about he himself not being

exceptional in living with the certainty that he must die because his own generation lived with this thought during World War II, he goes on to say that Heidegger's generation had the same experience during World War I. The clear implication is that Heidegger should have learned as much from his wartime experience as Kaufman did from his. Heidegger should, accordingly, know better than to make such statements as "The One (*Das Man* — the anonymous "one" — "everybody") does not allow the courage for anxiety of death to arise." Then within fourteen pages Kaufman dismisses Heidegger's contention that most men do not face up to the certainty of death as a "commonplace."

Kaufman treats Camus in much the same way that he treats Heidegger. But that is a bit more than he does with Kierkegaard and Jaspers. Kaufman says nothing about Jaspers' concept of *Scheitern* (shipwreck) nor of death as a "boundary-situation" — and there is a book by Karl Lehman called *Der Tod bei Heidegger und Jaspers*. Kierkegaard's *The Sickness Unto Death* is mentioned, but nothing is said about it — about such statements as "When death is the greatest danger, one hopes for life; but when one becomes acquainted with an even more dreadful danger, one hopes for death." And there are many more such statements in Kierkegaard's book and other books by Kierkegaard. For example, here is one which epitomizes what the editor and the discussant have called the theme of the whole book: "No bowstring can be drawn so tight, and can so speed the arrow, as the thought of death can hasten the living forward when earnestness tenses the bow." That is from the little essay called "The Decisiveness of Death" in *Thoughts on Critical Situations in Human Life*. Neither the essay nor the book are very well known but the same idea is to be found in editor Feifel's chapter. After saying that the knowledge of the "inevitable end of his earthly life" may make man introduce "a repressive element into all libidinal relations," Feifel adds, "At the same time, however, it can serve man positively as a galvanizing force — an Aristotelian *vis a tergo* if you will — pushing him forward towards creativity and accomplishment." This may not be as poetic a statement as Kierkegaard's but it at least makes the point that death can be a foil for life; and one will look in vain to find such an insight in the chapter on "existentialism and Death" — and this despite the fact that twenty years ago there was an article in the *Harvard Theological Review* by Seelye Bixler on "*Existenz-Philosophie*" in which Bixler pointed out that the impact of the thought of Heidegger and Jaspers on death is that it can and should be a foil for life.

Kaufman ends his chapter by citing Nietzsche and Hölderlin to illustrate the point that "not one of the existentialists has grasped the most crucial distinction that makes all the difference in facing death." The crucial distinction is that "he who has made something of his life can meet death without anxiety." The idea is summed up in Hölderlin's words, "Once I lived with the gods and more is not needed."

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Whether or not Tillich qualifies as an existentialist, in his chapter on "The Eternal Now" he makes precisely the same point that is to be found in Hölderlin. He adds the emphasis that facing death is essential to "the courage to be," saying, "And if one is not able to die, is he really able to live?" The full measure of existence is to be found in "the eternal now;" and having experienced that, "no more is needed."

Tillich goes on to make the distinction between eternity and an endless future. "An endless future," he says, "is without a final aim, it repeats itself and could well be described as an image of hell." Of course, immortality as such may be "the most abysmal thought," as Nietzsche said of "eternal recurrence;" but that is not all that can be said on the point. For example, Marcel, who certainly knows a "bad infinite" when he sees one, speaks with sufficient insight about "Presence" to indicate that he knows the meaning of "the eternal now;" and he has also made a nice point about conceptions of eternal life by posing the question, to what can you say "*encore*" eternally without "*ennui*"? St. Paul suggests something like this when he says, "If in this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men the most miserable." Whether or not that is exactly what St. Paul means, the implication is that those who have known Christ in this life have something that can be willed for eternity, whereas others who have gone "beyond the pleasure principle" may welcome death as a release from boredom. If St. Paul shows anxiety in the face of death it is not because he has not made something of himself but rather that he fears that death may terminate this most valued experience. The fear or anxiety is overcome by the faith that neither life nor death nor any other creature can separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Perhaps the most astounding assertion in Tillich's article is that the life everlasting is unbiblical. Tillich's rejection of belief in the life everlasting is, of course, not news. But when he says "many people — but not the Bible — speak loosely of the 'hereafter' or of 'life after death'," the reader can only assume that a new canon has been established rejecting Romans 8, I Corinthians 15 and I Thessalonians 4 as not genuine Paul. The point is not the distinction between "speaking loosely" about this matter and speaking precisely. Tillich says nothing more about the matter; and one can only conclude from what he says that the belief in the life everlasting is not to be found in the New Testament. This is carrying "realized eschatology" pretty far. Even though it is true that the Christian belief is not in the immortality of the soul but in the resurrection of the body, this belief affirms that death is not the last reality.

As one might expect, the question of life after death arises quite often in this book. Several of the authors assume that such an idea is completely incompatible with a "scientific" point of view; and they are soundly reprimanded by Gardner Murphy for such naive "scientism." But it is not only the belief itself that is

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discussed (or dismissed) but the effect of the belief. One author for example (C. W. Wahl) assures us that man must frankly face death as annihilation as the only hope for making life endurable: "It is on just such a hope, rather than on the promises of the mystics, that the progress of mankind depends." On the other hand, two others (Irving E. Alexander and Arthur M. Adlerstein) say that the important thing is for a person to take a stand one way or the other: it is uncertainty that causes harmful anxiety. It is also brought out that "religious" persons are more concerned with death than are "non-religious" persons, partly, of course, because of their concern with what happens after death. But certainly any data based on the information gathered from persons who call themselves believers (or non-believers, for that matter) is of little consequence. As the late David E. Roberts said, "A belief cannot be understood apart from what it means dynamically to the person who holds it." Above all, one must question the value and usefulness of any such findings as a guide to what one should believe.

The thing that is most conspicuously lacking in this book is something about what death means in terms of the Christian faith — which is not a matter of finding out what Christians in general say they believe but rather saying something in responsible conformity with the *depositum fidei*, the New Testament. For one thing it should be made clear that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body is very far from denying the reality of death, despite multitudinous assertions to the contrary by people who call themselves Christians as well as by those who do not. Some suggestions along that line have been made by Rosenstock in *The Christian Future* where, among other things, he points out that the Christian, by "anticipating death," lives "from the end of life into a new beginning." And Kierkegaard has said somewhere that a Christian should live each day as though it were his last and yet the first in a long life. Both of these ideas are derived from St. Paul's experience of dying daily and rising to the new man in Christ. If it is true, as both the editor and discussant say, that many of the findings in this book are worthy of further exploration, surely the question of the Christian attitude towards death deserves some initial exploration.

The Human Imagination is Fundamentally Human

FINLEY EVERSOLE

The Insiders: Rejection and Rediscovery of Man in the Arts of our Time by Selden Rodman. Louisiana State University Press, 1960, 130 pages, \$6.95.

Most of the theological writing about the arts which we have recently witnessed has concerned itself much more with what the arts have to say about man than with what they have to say about God, and rightly so. The issue of

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what kind of humanism is proper to the visual arts is that which confronts the reader of Selden Rodman's *The Insiders*.

Rodman's book, as another reviewer put it, "is an explosive shout by a man . . . too obviously spoiling for a fight to retain poise, patience, and a capacity for careful reasoning." Rodman gives one the impression, especially in the first part of his book, of being an art dilettante's Kierkegaard (without SK's genius) hell-bent on damning the Hegels of contemporary painting and sculpture. If it's a fight he's after, he's bound to get it.

Rodman defines his Insider (in opposition to Colin Wilson's Outsider) as one who "feels drawn to values outside himself strongly enough to examine them in his work," as one who "expresses that concern in some form of representational imagery," and as one who "searches for images of truth that will be meaningful to his contemporaries." The Insider is an artist who does "not regard art as an end in itself but as a means of comprehending life."

The Insider, thus defined, is, in Rodman's view, the real rebel in contemporary painting, violating, as he does, the canons of abstract art. Clive Bell's *Art*, which first appeared in 1913 (reprinted in 1958), sets forth the standard for abstract art: "The representative element in a work of art may or may not be harmful; always it is irrelevant. To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions." The roots of abstract expressionism are to be found in France, where artists "even before Cézanne were writing their own declarations of independence; they were proclaiming their right to create in defiance of any social, moral, or aesthetic conventions." Modern expressionism is further accounted for in terms of the hopelessness produced by our experience of two world wars, their death camps, etc. The artists whose consciousness has been shaped by these events, says Rodman, "express neither rebellion nor compassion. They turn inward upon themselves, back to the tribe, to the prehistoric cave . . . and to the womb."

Some of Rodman's arguments appear to defeat his own purpose. For example, he argues that the one-dimensional, timeless nature of painting, as against poetry or music or architecture, accounts for its popularity since the second world war. Why, he asks, "does our age prefer the one-dimensional?" His answer:

. . . the "educated" public . . . bases its taste, in "other-directed" fashion, on the preference of the tastemakers. . . . The pressures in our period against anything requiring emotional involvement, thought, study, preparation, *time* are massive. The artist himself is subject to these negative pressures. . . . If man's need for religious truth or ethical principle can be answered on the analyst's couch by an exposure of the child-savage in

him, what deeper truth can the artist reveal than the uninhibited scrawls and slashes of his own "natural" self?

It is never clear how the art of the Insider escapes the predicament of this one-dimensional medium thus defined.

Among the twisted arguments, by which Rodman seeks to add support to his thesis, is that which interprets the anxiety of Van Gogh as the product of his devotion to humanism in an age of scientism, the age of Manet, Monet, Seurat and Gauguin. Far more convincing is Sam Hunter's thesis that Van Gogh's anxiety resulted from his feeling of personal isolation from community, an isolation well-nigh absolute in the days before the rise of an international Bohemia or art community in which the artist could take refuge.

I personally share Rodman's critical attitude toward the "art-for-art's-sake" critics, his antipathy for Clive Bell and his disdain for Salvador Dali. I, too, have an interest in the human element in painting and sculpture. And I have a profound admiration for artists like José Clemente Orozco, Ben Shahn and Octave Landuyt. However, as Rodman defines his "Insider" thesis against all forms of expressionism, one begins to wonder where to draw the line. If expressionism in painting and sculpture is not, after all, a completely *human* element, then it ought to be altogether excluded from the kind of art defended by Rodman and the human defined in purely representational terms. But if expressionism is accepted as a valid and inescapable element in every work of art, as it surely is in all the artists admired by Rodman, then by what criteria (other than expressionism and representationalism) does one judge certain works not to be expressions of the human? At what point does the artist or critic say, "If art becomes more expressionistic than this, it ceases to be human art." Is Theodore Roszak's sculpture, *Anguish*, a less profound statement of the dehumanizing and human experience of *angst* than a somewhat more representational work by Edvard Munch or Paul Klee? Or is Picasso's *Minotauromachy* superior to his *Guernica* for possessing more representational elements? Surely not!

On the other hand, if, by reducing the representational element in a work of art, the artist expresses the reality of the human situation, who is to say that his expression — even of dehumanized man — is not also a human expression? Jean Dubuffet, whom Rodman would accept as an Insider, presents us with human effigies which, like Kafka's Gregor, are the creatures of a world that has experienced metamorphosis. Dubuffet's people are dehumanized men seen from a metaphysical position. A somewhat similar vision is provided us by the non-representational sculptures of Seymour Lipton, in Mogens Balle's *Window of My Soul* and Alexander Westherson's *Not Listening*. In short, we must agree with Paul Tillich that "every style points to a self-interpretation of man."

Rodman apparently wants humanism without iconoclasm. But Christians have generally seen that this kind of humanism leads to idolatry, that it limits us to

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a universe in which the only values are man-made, and that it undermines the Christian belief in the revelation of God breaking into history. Fortunately, Rodman is inconsistent and implicitly rejects many of the implications of his own views. To him, one may say that there is, of course, a right humanism which sees that man is neither god nor insect. Of such humanism, the iconoclasts and the tragedians are the indispensable allies!

Rodman's *Insiders* have much to say that is relevant to the Christian. There are the macabre paintings of Francis Bacon which seek "to terrify the beholder into a sense of reality from which he would otherwise choose to hide." Surely such art is the ally of the gospel with its demands that we face reality and confess that which we would rather hide or hide from. Orozco's *Shadowy Forces* is a profound indictment of the Christian church.

The *Insiders*, not in spite of but because of their use of expressionistic elements, help to make possible a Protestant visual art. Karl Barth has asserted "that there is no theological visual art. Since it is an event, the humanity of God does not permit itself to be fixed in images." But the expressionistic element in contemporary art is such that a painter like Francis Bacon may say, "A picture should be a recreation of an event rather than an illustration of an object." The humanity of God, expressed in such painting, does not permit itself to become an icon or "object."

Rodman's approach to the art of the Insider is essentially moralistic, and he approvingly quotes Balcomb Greene's words, "The doctrine of a pure aesthetic which disdains the image of man can only be disputed from the moralist's position, by those who wish to live." To this, the Christian may well object that moralism in any form conflicts with the *ultimate* judgments of a holy God as well as with the grace of God which enters into the tragedy of life as moralism cannot.

The final refutation of Selden Rodman's one-sided thesis may be found in these words from Paul Tillich's *Theology of Culture* :

The subject matter [of a work of art] is potentially identical with everything which can be received by the human mind in sensory images. It is in no way limited by other qualities like good or bad, beautiful or ugly, whole or broken, *human or inhuman*, divine or demonic. (Italics mine.)

Whatever can be expressed or received by the human imagination is fundamentally human — including the divine self-revelation — and is proper for a work of art that is concerned with the nature and destiny of man.

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
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When Michael Foster died on October 15, 1959, Great Britain and Germany lost a man of wide Christian influence who had laboured with all his powers to bring the two countries together after the War. It was characteristic of him that, after having enlisted as a private soldier and served throughout the War, he should when it ended have exerted himself to the utmost in helping the creation of happy and sane relations between the two countries, and have taken a professorial post in Germany at Cologne in the difficult years 1948 to 1950. When he returned to his work as tutor in philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford, Germany was never far from his mind, and his continued efforts did much to bring Germans into contact with Great Britain. We feel that his splendid work, so tragically cut short, should be commemorated in a way that he would approve, and we should like to see established a Scholarship which would bring a succession of German students to Oxford for a period of two years at a time. Such a scheme has already been welcomed in some quarters in Germany, and the German Academic Exchange Service is willing to create a similar Scholarship to bring young British scholars to Germany. We feel that this kind of exchange would be of the greatest benefit to Anglo-German relations and that something might be done by it to replace the unquestioned good which in past days was done by the presence in England of German Rhodes Scholars. We, therefore, appeal for £10,000 to form a capital sum, the interest on which would make it possible for a German student to be appointed every second year for a two year period, and would allow him to enjoy the amenities of Oxford without financial worry. Should it be impossible to raise the full sum required for this, the awards would be made less frequently.

Contributions should be sent to The Curators of the University Chest, Broad Street, Oxford, for the credit of the Michael Foster Memorial Fund.

Yours truly,

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